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## **BASELINE STUDY ON PREVENTING AND CONTAINING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN EIGHT REGIONS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF GHANA**

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## FOREWORD

Violent extremism has emerged over the years, and Africa as a continent has been noted to be vulnerable and serves as a hotspot for terrorist networks (Sharland et al., 2017). Despite the continent's pursuance to prevent and counter violent extremism, all actions to cease this discourse and its spread have proven insufficient. This is due to a myriad of factors like poor governance, lack of state accountability, porous borders and inadequate security forces. These factors create a pathway for extremist ideologies to evolve and promote their operations in the continent.

There have been sudden attacks on Ghana's neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso and Mali from extremist groups. Although Ghana has been known to be a peaceful country and has not experienced any extremist attacks yet, the government is fighting earnestly to prevent such invasion. However, in February 2023, there were media reports of an influx of about 4,000 displaced persons from Burkina Faso into Ghana's border regions due to Jihadist attacks in their country. This has resulted in a perceived level of insecurity among the people in the northern border regions of Ghana. This could further serve as a threat to the peace of the nation.

As part of Ghana's efforts at fighting and preventing violent extremism, a National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAFPCVET) was developed in 2019. The framework outlines collaborations by various institutions to identify threats of violent extremism and implement strategies to curb the possibility of extremist attacks. The NCCE is identified among these institutions, with the primary mandate to create awareness of violent extremism, carry out public education, and facilitate activities to instil in the citizens' security consciousness, and situational

awareness. NCCE's civic education activities on the subject are expected to also engender social inclusiveness and community cohesion.

In line with this call, in December 2022 the Commission with funding from the European Union launched an 18-month project titled "Preventing and Containing Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Eight Border Regions in Northern Ghana". To kick-start the PCVE project, this Baseline Study became necessary. Specifically, the study explores the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours of communities and at-risk groups regarding violent extremism and other forms of violence in the study areas. It also examined communities' tolerance level towards different religious and linguistic groups, and lastly, identified and assessed the contributions of state and non-state actors in the fight against violent extremism.

The Baseline study which was carried out in 59 districts in the eight (8) project regions had a total of 1,351 out of 1,353 participants who willingly participated in the study. A response rate of 99.8% was therefore recorded for the primary participants which confirms the willingness of community members to participate in the study. A total of 67 key informant interviews were also conducted with senior-level officers of selected state and non-state institutions.

The study is intended to inform and guide content development for public education on the subject by the NCCE. This baseline study will also serve as a benchmark for assessing the progress of project implementation. Furthermore, the study provides sector-specific micro-level data on the activities of security agencies, local NGOs' and Civil Society Organizations, which are necessary for enhancing their efforts in the provision

of better security for Ghanaians. The final output from the study adds to the wealth of empirical works produced by the NCCE on improving Ghana's security and democratic governance.

This study was completed through the immense support and contributions of various individuals and institutions (both state and non-state). The Commission expresses its appreciation to Dr. Festus Aubyn of the West African Network for Peace building (WANEP) for validating the study instruments at no cost.

The research work received full participation and commitment from all prospective primary participants and an appreciable number of key informants was contacted. Their responses and readiness to participate in the study are highly appreciated. We further acknowledge the dedication and hard work of NCCE's field officers across the study regions and districts who worked tirelessly to ensure that credible and comprehensive data are received for the study. The Administrative support given by the Regional Directors of the eight project regions, which contributed to the success of the study is also deeply appreciated.

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PREVENTING AND CONTAINING VIOLENT EXTREMISM



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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CT	Counter-Terrorism
FOSDA	Foundation for Security and Development in Africa
GAF	Ghana Armed Forces
GBC	Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
GCAA	Ghana Civil Aviation Authority
GCSD	Georgian Center for Security and Development
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
GPS	Ghana Police Service
GMA	Ghana Maritime Authority
GRA-CD	Ghana Revenue Authority- Customs Division
ISIS	Islamic States of Iraq and Syria
ISGS	ISIS in the Greater Sahel
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISWAP	ISIS West Africa Province
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NABOCADO	Navrongo Bolgatanga Diocesan Development Office
NAFPCVET	National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism
NACTEST	Nigeria's Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education

NCA	National Communications Authority
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NCSC	National Cyber Security Centre
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIA	National Identification Authority
NIB	National Intelligence Bureau
NIS	National Identification System
ODK	Open Data Kit
PCVE	Preventing and Containing Violent Extremism
PDA	Personal Digital Assistance
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNPAPVE	United Nations Plan of Action for the Prevention of Violent Extremism
VE	Violent Extremism
VET	Violent Extremism and Terrorism
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peace Building
NORPREVSEC	Preventing Electoral Violence and providing security to the Northern Border Regions of Ghana

## KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

### **Alienation**

Alienation is an individual's feeling of unease or discomfort reflecting their exclusion or self-exclusion from social and cultural activities or a feeling of social exclusion and marginalization.

### **At-Risk Group**

At-Risk Group are people vulnerable to any form of attack or violence.

### **Chieftaincy Disputes**

Chieftaincy Disputes is the misunderstanding that occurs between two or more factions on the enstoolment or enskinment of a chief or the misunderstanding between an incumbent chief and some of his subject.

### **Combating radicalization**

Combating radicalization is to prevent the process by which a person or group of persons are indoctrinated to accept and partake in violent extremist acts.

### **Containing**

Containing is the act of controlling or restraining something from happening.

### **CSO (Civil Society Organization)**

CSOs are non-state or non-profit voluntary entities formed by people that are separate from the state.

### **Counter-Terrorism**

Counter-terrorism incorporates the practice, military tactics, techniques and strategy that government, military enforcement, business, and intelligence agencies use to combat or prevent terrorism.

### **NGO (Non- governmental organization)**

NGOs are organized voluntary non-state institutions which mostly operate on a non-profit basis.

### **Extremism**

Extremism refers to the rejection of generally accepted societal beliefs, norms and way of life in preference to an alternative.

### **Ethnic Co-existence**

Ethnic Co-existence is when people in a particular vicinity live in harmony despite having different ethnic backgrounds.

## **Ethnicity**

Ethnicity is the quality or fact of belonging to a population, group or subgroup made up of people who share a common cultural background or descent.

## **Ethnic Conflict**

Ethnic conflict refers to the tension, hostility, and violence that arise from differences in ethnicity.

## **Herdsmanship**

Herdsmanship is providing quality responsible care or watching over a herd of cows, sheep and livestock.

## **Ideology**

Ideology is the systematic body of concepts, especially those of a particular group or political party or the content of the thinking characteristic of an individual, group or culture.

## **Injustice**

Injustice is when an individual or group treats another individual or group within a society unfairly, resulting in disadvantages to that individual or group.

## **Inter-communal**

## **clashes**

Inter-communal clashes are conflicts between two or more competing communities.

## **Land/ Boundary Disputes**

Land/ Boundary Disputes are the conflicting claims to rights on land by two/more parties, focused on a particular piece of land, which can be addressed within the existing legal framework.

## **Linguistic Groups**

Linguistic Groups are groups of related languages that have descended from a common ancestor which is called the proto-language of the family.

## **Marginalization**

Marginalization is the act of placing a person or thing in a position of lesser importance, influence, or power.

## **Non- State Actors**

Non- State Actors are individuals and organizations that are not affiliated with, directed by, or funded through any sovereign government, and often exercise significant political influence and territorial control.

## **Perpetrators**

Perpetrators are persons who carry out harmful, illegal and violent acts.

## **Preventing**

Preventing is the usage of deliberate measures to create awareness to inhibit Violent-Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana by addressing their root while minimizing our vulnerability to the threat through the building of resilience.

## **Political Affiliation**

Political Affiliation is any expression of or association with the ideals, issues, or ideologies of a political group, party, or organization.

## **Political Polarization**

Political Polarization refers to the cases in which an individual's stance on a given issue, policy, or person is more likely to be strictly defined by their identification with a particular political party (e.g., Democrat or Republican) or ideology (e.g., liberal or conservative).

## **Radicalization**

Radicalization is the process by which someone is indoctrinated to support/partake in terrorism and/or extremist activities.

## **Religious Intolerance**

Religious intolerance, on the other hand, refers to the inability of individuals or groups to tolerate and respect the beliefs and practices of others.

## **State Actors**

State Actors are persons who act on behalf of a governmental body and are therefore subjected to limitations imposed on them by the government.

## **Social Cohesion**

Social Cohesion refers to the strength of relationships and the sense of solidarity among members of a community/ defined as the degree of social integration and inclusion in communities and society at large, and the extent to which mutual solidarity finds expression itself among individuals and communities.

## **Terrorism**

The UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defines terrorism as “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, or taking hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing an act”.



## **Tolerance**

Tolerance is the ability to tolerate the opinions and behaviours that an individual disagrees with.

## **Violence**

Violence is the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm or deprivation.

## **Violent Extremism**

Violent Extremism refers to the justification, support and use of violence to achieve a goal, normally political, social, religious or ideological.

## **Vulnerable Groups**

Vulnerable groups are persons who are disadvantaged, socially, physically or mentally and are unable to provide their basic needs and therefore require specific assistance

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction

The current global agenda, SDG 16 emphasizes the need for member states to reduce all forms of violence. In response to Ghana's commitment in line with the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism developed the National Framework for the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism and Terrorism was developed to preserve the safety and security of its residents in 2019 despite the existence of a National Security Policy. The country has a long history of democratic governance, social cohesion and peaceful co-existence. Nevertheless, with the developing trend of violent extremism and terrorism in recent times across the globe, the African continent, particularly the Sahel-Saharan, and the West African sub-region continues to pose a great threat not only to the country's residents rather its holistic development. To ensure state-led action and the country's proactiveness in dealing with such a menace which would serve as a basis for future global partnerships to address violent extremism and terrorism in Ghana, the Ghana Anti-Terrorism Act, 2008, Act 762 was enacted as the primary legislation underlining the legal framework on Violent Extremism and Terrorism in the country. Furthermore, to build a shared understanding of violent extremism and terrorism activities, recognize the associated factors and risks, and explore ways in addressing them, the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) is implementing PCVE project with a focus on the prevention dimension to address violent extremism and terrorism in districts and regions sharing borders with Ghana's neighbouring countries. The project received financial support from the European Union Rapid Response pillar.

This report covers the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of study participants on violent extremism and the contribution of state and non-state actors in the fight against the menace in the study districts and regions. This is to help guide programmes and interventions needed to avert and contain violent extremism and terrorism, and social cohesion, peace and tolerance improvement in the country.

### Methodology

Findings from this report are based on a cross-sectional concurrent mixed methods design carried out in two phases, namely; quantitative (survey) and qualitative (key informant interviews) research methodologies. This report covers data collection carried out in February 2023 in 59 districts across eight (8) regions.

For the quantitative phase, study participants referred to as primary participants in this study, involved were persons aged 15 years and older residing in the selected districts and regions. Whereas a systematic sampling technique was used to select and identify the structures employing the Day's Code method, purposive and simple random sampling techniques were used to select households and individuals in these structures. A total of 1351 individuals out of 1353 were recruited for the study using a structured questionnaire embedded in an electronic device. This resulted in a response rate of 99.8 percent. Data were collected by trained research assistants' in-person and were in major local languages such as Kasem, Mampruli, Gonja, Twi, Fantra and Ewe. Data were managed in MS Excel and further exported into IBM SPSS (version 26.0) for analysis. Methods of analysis included frequencies, percentages, and partial credit scoring to generate the level of tolerance of study participants.

Study participants for the qualitative phase, classified as secondary participants were informants from key state and non-state institutions identified in the eight (8) project regions. Sixty-seven participants were purposively selected for the phase. The average number of key informants' interviews was eight (8) per region. Data collection was done using an interview guide. This was carried out by trained staff from the Research, Gender and Equality department from January 2023 to February 2023. The English language was the main medium of the interview, and the average interview duration was 45 minutes. Interviews were conducted in homes, offices and places of convenience for participants. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed into a text-based format for analysis guided by themes. Data were managed with the Atlas-ti application (version 7.5.7).

As part of the preparation stage of the project, data collection tools were pretested and validated to ensure accuracy and generate completeness. Additionally, monitoring and supervision were conducted during fieldwork to ensure accurate, timely and quality data. Ethics in research work were also observed to ensure the privacy, confidentiality and autonomy of all study participants.

## Findings

From the survey results, the demographic characteristics showed that, generally, male participants were slightly higher than females by 0.2 percent. Regional variation by sex showed more males recruited in the Bono East region while the proportion of female participants was highest in the Bono region. Many of the participants were in the age group, of 20-29 years. The average age for these primary participants was 37 years. Adolescents (15-19 years) and older persons (60 years and above) formed about one-tenth of the study participants respectively. More (64.8%) of the participants were in marital unions (married or living together) while about one-third had never been married. More than half of the participants reported being affiliated with the Islamic religion while two in every five were associated with the Christian religion. Many (23.1%) of the participants belonged to the Dagomba ethnic group while the least participant by ethnic group was the Mossi. Other ethnic groups which participated in the study were Ga-Dangme and Wagara.

The study also found that one-third had never attained any level of formal education. On the other hand, two in every five had attained a Secondary/SSS/SHS education level. A proportion of 12.1 constituted those who had attained a tertiary level of education. Many (40.1%) of the participants were self-employed (with/without employees), and a quarter (24.4%) were unemployed (looking for a job/not looking for a job). The majority (96.5%) of the participants were non-herdsmen while fewer than four percent were herdsmen.

For the qualitative phase of the study, 67/80 interviews with key informants were carried out. A total of 29 were from state actors like the security agencies (the Ghana Police Service (GPS), Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), National Investigation Bureau (NIB) and, Custom Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA)) while 38 were from non-state actors such as the civil society organization, media and the Offices of the Chief Imams. The highest number of key informant participants was among the security agencies such as the National Investigation Bureau while the least number of interviews were observed among the Ghana Armed Forces. Among the non-state actors, the highest participation was among the Civil Society

Organizations, media and the Offices of the Regional Chief Imams respectively. For other demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the key informants, the results showed that all the participants were males, and for educational background, 65/67 informants had tertiary education indicating a higher level of educational attainment.

The knowledge, attitudes and behaviours towards violent extremism and other forms of violence among both primary and secondary participants on violent extremism were examined. Two-thirds of the primary participants affirmed the correct meaning of the violent extremism concept. Generally, it was clear that key informants had a better understanding of the concept of violent extremism compared to the primary participants. While one in every ten of the primary participants knew of groups that promote hatred and discrimination against other groups and persons, less than 5.0 percent had knowledge of groups promoting violent extremism in their districts. The latter was more pronounced in the Bono East region of Ghana. This study revealed that the most common way of luring persons or groups to perpetrate violence was through the provision of money, and politicians were cited as the institution or group with a higher likelihood of supporting the activities of violent extremists. Less than two (2) percent of participants had knowledge of individuals recruited by an extremist group in their respective districts. At-risk groups or individuals for radicalisation indicated among participants were the unemployed and the youth. The motivation to join violent extremist groups was found to be unemployment, financial and gains, political and socio-economic marginalisation. About 23.0 percent of participants had ever heard about violent extremist activities in their respective districts in the last 12 months preceding the study with 5.1 percent reporting having witnessed violent extremist acts. Regional variation showed participants in Bono East to have the highest proportion of such witnesses (39.3%). Personal enrichment, corruption and poor performance by the government by not addressing the needs of its citizenry were identified as factors influencing the support for violent extremist groups.

This study explored communities' level of tolerance towards diverse groups of persons. Despite the high respect for persons of different linguistics, religious and political groups, pockets of discrimination were reported. For instance, 11.9 percent and 10.0 percent of primary participants reported having witnessed cases of persons being denied access to public facilities due to their disability status and political affiliation respectively. Regional differentials showed Upper East and Northern regions to have recorded such discrimination by disability status.

Unfair treatment was also reported to have been witnessed by some participants. This was based on persons' disability status, political affiliation and ethnicity. Also, the prevalence of discrimination and harassment was fewer than 10.0 percent for participants who had such experience once in their life irrespective of their gender, disability status, political affiliation, religion and ethnicity. However, between 4.4 percent and 14.3 percent of participants said they had been discriminated against given their gender, religion, ethnicity, political affiliation, and disability status several times. This discrimination was more pronounced based on one's disability status. The findings further revealed that females were more likely to be discriminated against based on their gender relative to their male counterparts. However, discrimination by disability status was more common among men than women.

Despite the general minimal perception of the level of existence of violence in the project study sites, almost half of the participants perceived the existence of political polarisation but not accompanied by a violent act. Also, the existence of land/boundary disputes, chieftaincy

factions, ethnic conflicts and political polarization were perceived to be associated with violence in the project regions. This finding was also emphasised among secondary participants during the key informants' interviews, especially, on chieftaincy factions and land/boundary disputes.

Generally, it was clear that there was consensus on the need for co-existence irrespective of one's religion, ethnicity, and political affiliation. A majority of the primary participants responded in the affirmative to the need to have individuals from different religious, ethnic groups, and political backgrounds as their neighbours, although, there were gender differentials. The study found that there is a high level of tolerance (88.0%) in these project districts and regions. This level was highest (89.7%) in the Oti region while Upper East recorded the lowest average score of 86.0 percent.

The contribution of both state and non-state actors including the media in the fight against violent extremism in the project regions was also explored among both primary and secondary participants. Participants mentioned that state actors such as security agencies play the role of gathering intelligence, having in place established structures, and collaborating with other institutions and stakeholders to address the risk and threat of violent extremism in the regions. For non-state actors like the religious and traditional authorities, they respond to the risk and threat of violent extremism by employing the use of their local mechanisms and religious teachings to encourage their worshippers and followers to maintain peace and peaceful co-existence between and among communities. Additionally, the role of the media in the fight against violent extremism cannot be overemphasised. Participants averred that the actor is also expected to educate the citizenry about extremism and methods of recruitment into such groups.

Furthermore, the study found that the presence of focal persons at the state and non-state institutions to spearhead activities related to violent extremism was generally non-existent respectively. Nevertheless, some security agencies, civil society organizations and faith-based organisations cited the existence of structures to address issues related to violent extremism. Findings from the study revealed that the existence of logistical and coordination challenges hinder state actors' fight against violent extremism. Also, it was clear from the study that community members' participation in fora or other forms of engagements on the prevention of violent extremism usually organized by government entities in their districts was not impressive.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

Addressing violence and violent extremism in the project's study areas calls for measures including strengthening education and sensitization, employment creation, border security strengthening and the elimination of political influences. Ultimately, the study will inform policy decisions and contribute to advancing knowledge on addressing violent extremism.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Introduction

Globally, Violent Extremism and Terrorism (VET) has become a widespread phenomenon and a threat to global peace and development, with Africa identified as being the most vulnerable (Institute of Economic and Peace, 2022). Largely, terrorist activities are complex and multifaceted and do not confine to national boundaries. In recent times, violent conflicts are no longer defined by national borders. For instance, the war between Russia and Ukraine has affected all facets of lives worldwide. In 2021, about 84 million people around the world were forced to flee their home country to escape conflict, violence, natural disasters, or persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political stance, or association with a particular social group (World Population Review, 2022).

In Africa, the number of refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons has increased over the years due to conflict, insecurity and violent extremist activities (United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) (2020). For instance, some countries in Africa including Angola, Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, Mali, South Sudan, Somalia, Cameroon, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Burundi are not out of the woods yet in terms of the experience of civil wars, ethnic tensions and political unrest (Achankeng, 2013; Marshall, 2006).

Additionally, terrorist networks and groups have grown in strength and geographic coverage. In 2012, Al-Shabaab for instance joined an alliance with Al-Qaeda, although this allegiance has recently tilted toward the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake, 2016). In 2015, the Nigerian group Boko Haram joined allegiance with the ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Guardian, 2015). The activities of these international networks and illicit groups are major threats to peace, stable governance and national development.

In 2014, violent attacks, unleashed on civilians by militants occurred in several West African states including Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso which resulted in the loss of lives and destruction of property (Annan, 2014).

The West African sub-region records significantly the highest trends of terrorist and extremist activities in comparison with other regional blocs on the continent, with many of the cases occurring in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Mali and Niger (WANEP, 2019). In Burkina Faso alone, the National Defence and Veterans Affairs Ministry reported that 283 terrorist attacks were recorded between 2015 and 2019 (Bougoum, 2019). In Nigeria, violent attacks by extremist groups were highest in 2015, with 456 events, and 325 attacks per year through 2016 – 2017. Similarly, in Mali, about 237 terror attacks were recorded in 2018 which was an increase from 226 in 2017 and 183 the previous year (WANEP, 2019).

In Kenya, between 2013 and 2020, Al-Shabaab had over four different attacks including the Westgate Mall (2013), Garissa University (2015), Nairobi city (2019) and the Kenyan airfield (2020) attacks (Campbell, 2020). These attacks by the terrorist groups led to about 239 deaths in total. In 2021, attacks and atrocities by armed Islamist groups, and unlawful killings by state



security forces and pro-government militias during counterterrorism operations, in Burkina Faso have led to over 135 civilian deaths and about 237, 000 displaced people (World Report, 2022). In 2023, similar attacks by a suspected jihadi group in the Capital of Burkina Faso resulted in about 30 deaths including 16 volunteers (Voice of America (VoA), 2023). Over the past four years, neighbouring countries to Burkina Faso including Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Ghana have played host to over 50,000 refugees that have fled the country as a result of terrorist attacks.

Empirically, poverty and unemployment, and the activities of outside religious and extremist groups have been noted as driving forces of violent extremism and radicalization (Georgian Center for Security and Development (GCSD), 2018). Meanwhile, Africa as a continent continues to grapple with a demographic youth bulge, large unemployment and poverty statistics, and porous security borders which are all positive avenues for illicit activities (Sharland et al., 2017). Current events suggest that the threats of violent extremism and terrorism in the sub-region are on the increase.

Despite these worrying statistics of VET activities in the sub-region, security-led approaches have generally failed to contain the geographic footmark of violent extremists and their operations. The region as a whole faces challenges in addressing terrorism and violent extremism. West Africa in particular has become a fulcrum for perpetrators of violent extremism and terrorism with frequent reports of attacks and other activities undertaken by the Boko Haram militant groups (KAIPTC, 2016). This threatens the growth of democratic governance, economic development, human safety, security and peace in the region.

Ghana is often hailed as the star of Africa and a beacon of peace in terms of respect for human rights and rule of law, sustained peace and stable democracy. However, the emerging trends of security threats from terrorist and extremist activities and the growing insecurity in the West African region could hamper the country's stability. The evidence above on attacks experienced by Ghana's neighbouring countries suggests that the country isn't immune to violent attacks and illicit network activities. The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) study on the 'Risk/Threat Analysis of Violent Extremism and other forms of Violence in ten border regions of Ghana' confirms the country's vulnerability to terrorism and extremist attacks (National Commission for Civic Education, 2021).

Additionally, the country faces wide-ranging peace and security challenges. There are clusters of chieftaincy and ethnic clashes, farmer-herder conflicts, violent demonstrations and armed robberies dotted across the country. For example, the renewed clashes between Mamprusi and Kusasi in Bawku and Nalerigu over chieftaincy conflicts in Chereponi, and the Doba-Kandiga ethnic conflict in Kassena-Nankana Municipality in the Upper East region are some but a few violent cases in point. Also, there are increasing reports of the proliferation of arms, drug trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, and murder cases in the country (Aning & Abdallah, 2013; BBC, 2019; International Press Institute, 2023). In NCCE's 2020 study on matters of concern to the Ghanaian voter for instance, vigilantism, violent extremism and electoral violence were found to be major security threats that can undermine the peace and stability in the country. The study also reported that the proliferation of small arms and weapons was on the rise.

The activities of extremist groups within the West African sub-region tend to be getting closer to their closest neighbouring countries. A report by WANEP in 2019 suggests that extremist groups such as Boko Haram, ISIS West Africa Province (ISWAP), ISIS in the Greater Sahel (ISGS), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Nusrat al-Islam and Al-Mourabitoun expand their operations to countries such as Benin, Ghana and Togo. The increasing presence of these groups and the emerging trends of attacks tend to undermine human security and stability in Ghana.

Generally, the process of radicalization to violent extremism and terrorism usually involves multiple facilitators and may well vary by individual, group, type of belief system, and context (GCSD, 2018). Thus, preventing and containing violent extremism and terrorism in any part of the globe requires a multifaceted approach.

The UN, in its effort to control and prevent violent extremism and terrorism, has, through its Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), enjoined nations, especially UN member states to establish terrorist acts as serious criminal offences in their domestic laws and regulations (National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism - NAFPCVET, 2019). The member countries are also expected to plan and take actions to prevent and counter-terrorism. Based on this, many initiatives have emerged in the African continent to combat and counter violent extremism and terrorism including Nigeria's Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism (NACTEST) (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake, 2016) and Ghana's National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET).

In the case of Ghana, the Anti-Terrorism Act (Act 762) 2008, was passed in 2008. This act provides a definition of a terrorist act, criminalizes it and prescribes punishments associated with the offence. Following the passage of Ghana's Anti-Terrorism Act and based on the increasing threats of violent extremism and terrorism across the sub-region, the country in 2019, implemented the NAFPCVET. The framework provides a blueprint for identifying the threat of violent extremism and terrorism and also provides an architecture, context and strategy to prevent and counter these threats.

Generally, the over-militarized response and approach to countering terrorists through physical means has largely not yielded the desired results but rather resulted in more civilian lives lost. Given this, a softer and less militarized approach that helps to build and develop resilience among communities that are predisposed to violent extremism is encouraged as a mechanism to prevent and contain VET.

Therefore, in 2016, the United Nations Plan of Action for the Prevention of Violent Extremism (UNPAPVE) was instituted. The action plan went beyond the security-centric approach to violent extremism and provided systemic, multi-tiered and synchronized steps to pre-emptively address conditions triggering radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism (UN News Centre, 2016). In this regard, the European Union (EU), as part of its effort to reduce terrorism across the globe, designed a Counter-Terrorism (CT) Strategy which revolves around four main pillars – Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond. This strategy aimed to reduce terrorism worldwide while respecting the rights of people. Ghana's NAFPCVET is equally hinged on four pillars that are Prevent, Pre-empt, Protect and Respond.



The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) with support from the European Union's Rapid Response pillar is implementing a project that largely focuses on the prevention dimension of addressing VET. The goal of the Action is to help prevent and contain violent extremism and terrorism and promote social cohesion, peace and tolerance in the country.

Additionally, the Action aims to strengthen state and non-state actors at the national, regional and community levels in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism. In line with the project design of generating micro-level empirical data to inform and guide targeted education, a baseline study was undertaken. The study on one hand serves as a tool for the effective implementation and future evaluation of NCCE's project. Additionally, it will also serve as a resource document for assessing the country's preparedness in implementing the preventive pillars on addressing governance gaps and safeguarding the Ghanaian society including vulnerable groups from violent extremism and terrorism.

## 1.2 Rationale for the Study

Violent extremism and terrorism, sit at the forefront of today's policy discussions, in both developed and developing countries. In response to reduce this menace in Ghana, the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) in partnership with the European Union launched the Preventing and Containing Violent Extremism (PCVE) Action Project in eight regions of Ghana in December 2022. The PCVE action project aimed at strengthening state actors (governance, security, media) and non-state actors at the national and community levels respectively in the fight against violent extremism. Additionally, the action project aimed at identifying individuals at risk and providing them with strong resilience to prevent them from joining violent or criminal groups. The project contributes to achieving the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development through the promotion of good and inclusive governance. The project also gives prominence and relevance to the 1992 Constitution's provisions on the promotion of peace and tolerance, and peaceful co-existence as stipulated in Articles 17(2) and 35(5) respectively.

As part of the project design, findings from this baseline study thus assist the NCCE and partner institutions to develop early warning and intelligence-gathering capacities in the fight against violent extremism and other forms of violence. The assessments undertaken in this study provide information, particularly on regional and district-level knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of communities and at-risk groups to VE and other forms of violence in the eight project regions. This will contribute significantly to providing early warning signs as well as critical information for the formulation of counter-extremist strategies.

Lastly, this study serves as a gauge for measuring progress on the project in the assessment of the knowledge of residents on the subject, their tolerance for people of diverse backgrounds and their appreciation of institutional response to addressing the menace. In addition, this study provides vital indicators for examining the threat posed by violent extremists to the country.

### 1.3 Study Objectives

Broadly, the study investigated the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of the study communities on violent extremism and the contribution of state and non-state actors in the fight against the menace. Specifically, the study

- assessed the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of communities and at-risk groups to VE and other forms of violence in the study areas;
- examined communities' levels of tolerance towards different religious and linguistic groups;
- identified and assessed the contributions of state and non-state actors in the fight against VE.

### 1.4 Organization of the report

The report is organized into eight chapters. Chapter one introduces the reader to the background of the study, the objectives and the rationale for the study. Chapter two describes in detail the methodological processes applied in carrying out the study. Ethical considerations adopted in the research process are also highlighted in this chapter while the socio-demographic characteristics of the study participants are presented in the third chapter.

In chapter four, the report highlights feedback received on issues related to the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of communities and at-risk groups to VE and other forms of violence in the study areas. In addition to general knowledge of the menace, motivations for joining violent extremist groups and factors influencing the support of VE groups are captured in this chapter.

Chapter five provides an assessment of communities' level of tolerance towards people of different backgrounds in Ghana while chapter six highlights the contribution of state and non-state actors in the fight against violent extremism. The chapter also presents results on challenges faced by institutions in responding to the risk and threat of violent extremism in Ghana, and the recommendations proffered for strengthening their efforts in the fight.

In chapter seven, the report presents the gender dynamics of violent extremism and other forms of violence in Ghana. Specifically, the chapter highlights the role of women as perpetrators and sources of resolution of conflicts and violent extremist activities. Lastly, Chapter eight provides a summary of the key findings from the study and presents key policy and programme-related recommendations.

## CHAPTER TWO

### STUDY METHODOLOGY

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology adopted to address the objectives of the study. It presents the study design and area, the target population, sampling techniques and sample size determination, and the procedure for the study participants' selection. Additionally, it provides a vivid description of the data collection methods and sampling procedures, data management and analysis techniques, reporting as well as ethical considerations adhered to in the study.

#### 2.2 Study Design

A cross-sectional concurrent mixed methods design was used for the study. The mixed methods encompassed both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. This approach was utilized given the fact that both methodologies complement each other in terms of findings' generalization (quantitative research), and the generation of deeper meanings of these findings (qualitative research). Based on the research methodologies adopted, the study was carried out in two (2) phases, that is, the quantitative and qualitative phases.

#### 2.3 Scope and Sampling

This study was carried out in 8 out of the 16 regions in Ghana. At the district level, the project sites constituted 59 districts. The eight (8) regions included Upper East and West, North East, Northern, Savannah, Bono, Oti and Bono East regions. These regions were selected based on the under-listed criteria:

1. Regions sharing border(s) with neighbouring countries which have ever experienced some acts of violent extremism, and are likely to serve as entry points to violent extremists groups;
2. Regions serving as an intermediate region linking border regions to both middle and coastal regions of the country, hence, creating a means of exposure to the threats of violent extremism to these regions.

Furthermore, the inclusion criteria for the selection of the 59 districts (Appendix A) were:

1. Districts that share a border with neighbouring countries;
2. Districts with a population of 75,000 and more.

## 2.4 Phases of the study

### 2.4.1 Quantitative phase of the study

#### 2.4.1.1 Study Population

The study population for the quantitative phase were residents aged 15 years and above in the localities within the 59 districts across the 8 regions.

#### 2.4.1.2 Sample Size, distribution and procedure

The sample size for this phase of the study was 1,353 participants. This was calculated using the Krejcie and Morgan formula. The formula provides a representative sample required for empirical studies and is suitable for calculating samples from known populations (Krejcie and Morgan, 1970)

Based on the proportionate shares of a region's and district's populations respectively, the sample size was distributed across the selected districts and regions respectively [Appendix III]. However, district samples were distributed evenly for two localities within a district. Further, for each locality sample, equal samples for males and females, with a higher female proportion for odd number samples were selected. For each male-female sample, close to half was administered to the youth (15-35 years). Overall, the study had 1351 individuals out of 1353 earmarked for the study responding to the questionnaire giving a response rate of 99.8 percent.

Both purposive and simple random sampling techniques were used to select primary participants for this phase of the study. For the simple random technique, the lottery method was employed. With this method, members of the household were assigned numbers depending on the size of the household. A list of assigned numbers on pieces of paper was randomly selected by the head of the household for the interview. This method gives every member of the household an equal chance to participate in the study. The purposive sampling technique was however employed to select a proportion of the youthful population and herdsmen at the various study areas.

Not all, the selection of structures within which these households and individuals are found was done using systematic sampling by employing the Day's Code technique to select the first structure while an interval of 5 was maintained in selecting subsequent structures.

#### 2.4.1.3 Data Collection Tool and Method

A structured questionnaire was used for this phase of the study. The questionnaire was used to elicit information from participants, and it covered information on demographics and socio-economic characteristics, knowledge, attitudes and behaviours towards violent extremism, as well as communities' level of tolerance towards people of different backgrounds (ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc).

Data collection was undertaken by trained Research Assistants using a face-to-face approach with the structured questionnaire embedded in an electronic device (Personal Digital Assistant-

PDA) through the Open Data Kit (ODK) software application. Data collection was carried out in February 2023. Data collection was carried out in major local languages including Kasem, Sissala, Dagaare, Mamprulu, Waale and Gonja for the Upper East, West, North East and Northern regions respectively. In Bono, Bono East and Oti on the other hand, the interviews were conducted in either Twi, Fante, Fantra or the Ewe languages.

#### **2.4.1.4 Data Management and Analysis**

Data collected were synchronized into an existing database hosted by the NCCE Head Office. Data stored in the database were downloaded into MS Excel, cleaned and exported into IBM SPSS (version 26.0) for checking for inconsistencies and blanks prior to analysis. Techniques used for analysis included frequency counts, percentage and proportion distribution. Additionally, the Partial Credit scoring technique was also used to generate scores to assess the tolerance level of participants towards different ethnic, religious, linguistic and political groups.

### **2.4.2 Qualitative phase of the study**

#### **2.4.2.1 Study Population**

The study population for the qualitative phase comprised participants from key institutions (state and non-state) including the security services (Ghana Police Service, Ghana Immigration Service, Customs Division of GRA, National Investigations Bureau and the Ghana Armed Forces), traditional/ religious authorities, civil society organizations (Holistic Development Organization, Navrongo, Bolgatanga Diocesan Development Office (NABOCADO), FOSDA etc.), and media within the 8 study regions.

#### **2.4.2.2 Sample Size, distribution and procedure**

A total of sixty-seven (67) interviews were carried out among the key informants with an average of eight (8) interviews per region. Participants were purposively selected. These comprised heads of the identified institutions or their designated officers in the study regions [Appendix IV].

#### **2.4.2.3 Data Collection Tool and Method**

This phase of the study employed an interview guide to explore institutional information on violent extremism, and the contribution of these institutions (state and non-state actors) in the fight against violent extremism. Trained staff from the Research, Gender and Equality department carried out the data collection in-person between January 2023 and February 2023. The main language for the interviews was English. The average interview duration was 45 minutes. Interviews were carried out in places convenient for participants such as their offices, home and other public places.

#### 2.4.2.4 Data Management and Analysis

Interviews with the key informants were audio-taped and transcribed into a text-based format for ease of analysis and imported into the Atlas-ti application (version 7.5.7) for thematic analysis. Patterns of meanings which addressed the study's objectives were identified through a rigorous process of familiarisation, data coding and theme development.

### 2.5 Preparatory Activities for Field Data Collection

#### 2.5.1 Pre-Testing of Instrument/Interview Guide

The data collection instruments (questionnaire and interview guide) were pre-tested by two (2)

Officers from the Research, Gender and Equality Department in two (2) selected districts in the Volta Region of Ghana that is, Anloga and Hohoe Municipalities. These districts were selected based on the findings from a previous similar study, by the NCCE, the Risk and Threat Analysis Study on Violent Extremism in 10 border regions of Ghana (NCCE, 2021). These two (2) districts recorded a higher proportion of participants who reported having knowledge of persons engaged in violent acts. Hence, carrying out the pre-test exercise in these areas helped in shaping the study instruments, and ensuring quality, conciseness and completeness.

In addition to the pre-testing exercise, the draft key informant guide was pretested by a senior researcher at the West African Network for Peace-building (WANEP) for review and validation.

#### 2.5.2 Training for Data Collection

Two major training approaches were adopted for the collection of quantitative data for the study. These were virtual and in-person sessions. Participants for the training were research assistants and resource persons. Whereas the research assistants constituted staff of NCCE who held at least a rank of an Assistant Civic Education Officer (CEO) and above with a minimum qualification of Higher National Diploma (HND) or Bachelor's degree, the resource persons were the Lead/Principal Researcher (Director of Research, Gender and Equality, NCCE), and the technical staff of NCCE's Research Gender and Equality Department. In addition, other participants at the training included representatives from the European Union (EU) project office at the NCCE and some management members of the NCCE. Further, the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the NCCE joined the training virtually to give remarks for both the opening and closing ceremonies.

A total number of 61 trainees/RAs participated in the training. The virtual training approach adopted the combination of teaching and learning techniques like PowerPoint presentations, discussions, translation of study instruments and role plays. Trainees were divided into three (3) groups with an average of twenty participants in each group. The training focused on the study objectives and approach, sampling of study households and participants, how to conduct community entry, understanding the questions in the local languages, how to conduct interviews, and how to collect the data electronically (Use of the PDAs).

The in-person training approach followed the virtual training. This was a one (1) day training carried out among the selected RAs and officers from the RGED across selected regional offices

of the NCCE where the study is being carried out. The in-person training sought to allow selected RAs for the study to ask questions, and seek clarification and detailed explanations on areas discussed during the virtual session. In furtherance, it also allowed the trainers to reiterate the study methodology. All required logistics for data collected were also distributed to the respective RAs at the training session.

To ensure the smooth conduct of the Key Informant interviews, the Director of the Research, Gender and Equality Department, organized a one-day training session for nine (9) senior staff attached to the department on modalities for conducting the key informant interviews. The training looked at the content and requirements of the interview guide, rapport-building, probing skills, and effective documentation of information collected. The training took place at the Head Office of the NCCE.

### 2.5.3 Monitoring and Supervision

To ensure a successful data collection exercise, monitoring and supervision of primary data collection were undertaken. The monitoring exercise which was largely in the form of spot-checking was undertaken to ensure that data is collected in a timely and accurate manner, and also to ascertain whether the right methodology was employed for the study. The exercise was undertaken in 20 out of the 59 study districts in all eight project regions over a period of four (4) days. Monitoring of fieldwork was undertaken by staff of the RG&E Department of the NCCE, Regional Directors of the study regions and NCCE's Executive body. The overall coordination and supervision of the data collection exercises were undertaken by NCCE's Director of Research, Gender and Equality.

## 2.6 Ethical considerations

The heads of the selected stakeholder institutions at the national level were formally informed about the study and the scheduled Key Informant interviews to be conducted in their respective regional offices. These included the security agencies and the national offices of Faith-based institutions. Formal letters were also presented to the offices of selected NGOs/CSOs and media organizations at the regional level. The Director of the Research, Gender and Equality department sent out the letters to the aforementioned agencies on behalf of the NCCE.

All Research Assistants were also given official letters about the study and the data collection exercise to facilitate a smooth community entry process. At the household level, permission was sought from the household heads. Participants also consented verbally to participate in the study.

## 2.7 Reporting

An eleven-member team made up of Nine (9) from the Research, Gender and Equality Department and Two (2) from the University of Ghana undertook data management and reporting on the study. The results from the quantitative data are presented largely as descriptive in the form of tables, charts, graphs and mean scores with brief narrations. The findings of the quantitative data are further supported by associated themes and quotations of the output generated from the qualitative analysis.



## CHAPTER THREE

### BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the background characteristics of the study participants. Two categories of participants were contacted; primary participants comprising persons 15 years and above from selected districts for the quantitative phase of the study, and secondary participants who were senior officers of security agencies and heads of non-state institutions such as CSOs and religious organizations for the qualitative phase.


The results for the background characteristics of the primary participants are disaggregated by sex, age, marital status, religious affiliations, and ethnic background. Other characteristics included the levels of education attained, employment status, and herdsmanship status. On the other hand, secondary participants are disaggregated based on institution, designation and educational background. These characteristics are emphasized to provide perspectives for further analysis and to establish the relationship between these characteristics and other key outcomes. Age for instance provides a spectrum of understanding on how individuals of different age groups perceived the concept of violent extremism.

#### 3.2 Characteristics of Primary Participants

##### 3.2.1 Sex of Primary Participants

Figure 3.1 depicts the distribution of primary participants by sex. Generally, there were more male participants as compared to females. Slightly more than half of the study participants (50.1 percent) were males.

**Figure 3.1: Percentage distribution of primary participants by Sex**



*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*



Table 3.1 depicts the distribution of the sex of participants by region. Female participation was highest in the Bono region (53.6%) while Bono East had the lowest proportion of 44.7 (Table 3.1). Further, the highest male participation in the study was in the Bono East region (55.3%) and the least proportion was 46.4 recorded in Bono. A proportion Interestingly, the Northern region recorded fifty (50) percent of males and females participation respectively.

**Table 3.1: Percentage of regional distribution of primary participants by Sex**


Region	Male (%)	Female (%)
Bono	46.4	53.6
Bono East	55.3	44.7
Northern	50.0	50.0
North East	49.4	50.6
Oti	48.2	51.8
Savannah	52.5	47.5
Upper East	49.4	50.6
Upper West	48.6	51.4

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

### 3.2.2 Age of Primary Participants

Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the primary participants by age group. The average age of the primary participants was 37 years (Standard Deviation (SD)±15.026) years. The minimum age was 15 years whilst the maximum age was 89 years. Largely, the highest proportion (28 percent) of the participants was within the 20-29 years age group whilst those aged 15-20 years had the lowest proportion (9.3%).

**Figure 3.2: Percentage distributions of participants by Age Group**




*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

### 3.2.3 Marital Status of Primary Participants

The study further examined the marital status of participants. Figure 3.3 presents the distribution of the primary participants by marital status. Two-thirds of these participants were married (63.1%) while less than one percent were separated. One-third of the primary participants were single, that is, never married (Figure 3.3).

**Figure 3.3: Percent distribution of participants by Marital Status**




*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

### 3.2.4 Religious Affiliation of Primary Participants

The religious affiliation of people plays a critical role in shaping their mindset and behaviour. Figure 3.4 presents the distribution of the primary participants by religious affiliation. More than half (53.4%) of the study's primary participants were affiliated with the Islamic religion compared to two-fifth (40.5%) who reported to be Christians. The traditionalist, other religions and those with no religion constituted 6.1 percent (Figure 3.4).

**Figure 3.4: Percentage distribution of primary participants by Religious Affiliation**




Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023

### 3.2.5 Ethnicity of Primary Participants

Figure 3.5 depicts the results for the distribution of primary participants by ethnicity. The ethnic group with the highest percentage (23.1 percent) of participants was Dagomba, followed by the Akan group (8.4 percent), and then the Konkomba group (7.7 percent). The Mossi group had the least proportion (1.0 percent). Other ethnic groups such as Ga-Dangme, Wagara, Yansi and Hausa formed a proportion of 5.1 (Figure 3.5).

**Figure 3.5 Percentage distribution of primary participants by Ethnic Group**




Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023

### 3.2.6 Educational Background of Primary Participants

Figure 3.6 illustrates the distribution of the primary participants by the level of education attained. Close to one-third (28.7%) had never received any formal education whereas one-fifth had attained a Secondary/SSS/SHS level of education. Those with tertiary level of educational attainment constituted 12.1 percent. About four (4) percent reported having attained other level of education such as the Quranic School (Figure 3.6).

**Figure 3.6: Percentage distribution of primary participants by level of education attained**



Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023

### 3.2.4 Employment Status of Primary Participants

The employment status of the participants was grouped under six (6) broad themes; namely; employee (Public and private sectors), self-employed (without employee(s) and with an employee(s)), casual worker, apprentice, domestic employee, and unemployed (looking for a job or not looking for a job). Table 3.2 presents the results for the distribution of the study's primary participants by employment status. The table shows that the majority (75.5%) of the study's primary participants were engaged in some form of economic activity. The self-employed accounted for 40.1 percent whilst the casual worker category had the least proportion of 4.6 (Table 3.2). Those who were unemployed formed about a quarter (24.4%) of the primary participants.

**Table 3.2 Percentage of primary participants by Employment Status**


Employment Status	Percentage
Employee	12.6
Self-employed	40.1
Casual worker	4.6
Apprentice	9.2
Domestic employee	9.1
Unemployed	24.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

### 3.2.8 Herdsmanship Status of Primary Participants

Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of study primary participants by herdsman status. A proportion of 3.5 were Herdsmen while close to 97 percent (96.5%) were non-herdsmen.

**Figure 3.7 Percent distribution of Herdsman (%)**



*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

### 3.3 Characteristics of Secondary Participants

This section presents the demographic and socio-economic profile of secondary participants from the baseline study. Specifically, the study collected information on the institutional, designation and educational level of these participants.

### 3.3.1 Sex of Secondary Participants

The background information of the participants interviewed is essential for the interpretation of results. Technically, the different gender or sexes has implications for violent extremism activities. In all, sixty-seven (67) key informant interviews were conducted. Interestingly, all participants were males. This could be attributed to the fact that in most cases, positions in such institutions like security agencies, Civil Society Organizations, and religious authorities are predominantly occupied by men. Hence, all the study secondary participants turned out to be males.

### 3.3.2 Level of Educational Attainment by Secondary Participants

Education influences several outcomes including raising society's awareness, dispelling superstition, improving health and income stability, as well as promoting positive attitude. Additionally, education improves knowledge about events within one's surroundings. Thus, it is important to understand the educational background of the study participants. Overall, sixty-five (65) participants had attained a tertiary level of education, whereas one each had Ordinary Level and Middle school leaving certificates respectively.

### 3.3.3 Institutional Affiliation of Secondary Participants

The study was expected to interview eighty (80) participants in all. However, sixty-seven (67) key informant interviews were successfully conducted across the eight regions in the northern part of the country. Table 3.3 and 3.4 depicts the regional distribution of the secondary participants by institutional affiliation. Of this number, thirty-eight (38) were non-state actors and twenty-nine (29) were from security agencies and public media outlets. The non-state actors included Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the Media, the Christian Council, the Office of the Chief Imam, and Traditional Authorities. Furthermore, the Security Agencies included the Ghana Police Service (GPS), Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), the National Investigation Bureau (NIB) and, the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA).

**Table 3.3 Distribution of Security Agencies by region.**

Region	NIB	Army	GIS	Customs (GRA)	GPS
Northern	1	0	1	1	0
Savannah	1	0	1	1	1
Upper West	1	0	1	1	1
Upper East	1	0	1	1	0
Oti	1	1	0	1	0
North East	1	1	1	1	1
Bono	1	1	0	1	1
Bono East	1	1	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

Further, Table 3.3 showed that security agencies had the highest key informant participation, particularly, the National Investigation Bureau (NIB), followed by Customs Division (GRA) with seven (7) interviews while the Ghana Police Service (GPS) and Ghana Armed Forces had the least interviews of four (4) conducted respectively.

Table 3.4 presents the distribution of the secondary participants by Non-state Actors by region. The highest participation was the Civil Society Organizations, Media, and the Office of the Regional Chief Imam respectively. Although most of the media outlets visited were private, the media stations visited in the Bono and Upper East regions were state-owned.

**Table 3.4 Distribution of Non-state Actors by region.**

Region	Media	CSO	House of Chiefs	Christian Council	Chief Imam
Northern	1	1	1	1	1
Savannah	1	1	1	1	1
Upper West	1	1	1	1	1
Upper East	1	1	1	1	1
Oti	1	1	0	1	1
North East	1	1	1	1	1
Bono	1	1	1	1	1
Bono East	1	1	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

## CHAPTER FOUR

### KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS OF COMMUNITIES AND AT-RISK GROUPS TOWARDS VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE

#### 4.1 Introduction

Lately, there has been growing attention on the role of communities in preventing and countering violent extremism and other forms of violence. This is grounded on the fact that communities are time and again the first line of target to these types of threats. Communities can also play a critical role in identifying and addressing the root causes of violence. However, for communities to be effective in this role, it is crucial to understand their knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours towards violent extremism and other forms of violence (Jones, 2019).

The chapter presents the results of the analysis of study participant's knowledge, attitudes and behaviours towards violent extremism and other forms of violence. The results are presented under three major sub-sections. The first section presents the study participants' knowledge of violent extremism. The second and third sub-sections highlight the attitudes and behaviours of community members towards violent extremism and the existence of other forms of violence in the study areas.

Where possible, the data are disaggregated by region, sex, and at-risk groups. The at-risk group is classified as people vulnerable to any form of attack or violence and are in a position to be radicalized to engage in any form of violence. The results are largely presented as descriptive in the form of frequency counts, and percentages with brief narrations. The results from the key informant interviews are also presented to explain and support finding from the quantitative data.

#### 4.2 Knowledge of Community Members towards Violent Extremism

The study assessed community members and KIs' knowledge on the concept of violent extremism, knowledge of violent extremist groups, their existence or otherwise in the districts, the potential victims of extremist attacks and the effect of the menace on the district/region.

##### 4.2.1 Knowledge of the Concept of Violent Extremism

In this study, four scenarios were used to assess the primary respondents' knowledge of the concept of violent extremism. There were three incorrect statements and only one correct statement describing the concept and participants were to state their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement. Table 4.1 outlines the study participants' levels of agreement or disagreement with the statements.



**Table 4.1: Statements Explaining Violent Extremism (%)**

Correct Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
An act of justification, support and use of violence to achieve a goal normally political, social, religious or ideology	22.7	44.3	3.7	20.2	6.6	2.5
Incorrect Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
A serious and prolonged disagreement among persons or groups of persons	12.5	43.1	5.0	26.1	10.6	2.7
Deceiving others to take advantage of them	11.2	37.6	5.9	33.6	7.0	4.7
Using one's resources to fight injustice	8.6	34.9	7.2	33.2	9.4	6.7

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

In table 4.1, approximately two-thirds (67.0%) of the primary participants correctly affirmed violent extremism as an act of justification, support and use of violence to achieve a goal normally political, social, religious or ideology. On the other hand, 55.6% of the primary participants affirmed the wrong statement that describes violent extremist as a serious and prolong disagreement among persons or groups of persons. Other wrong statements affirmed by the study participants were deceiving others to take advantage of them (48.8%) and using one's resources to fight injustice (43.5%).

Presented in table 4.2 is the regional analysis of primary study participants who affirmed the correct statement used to describe violent extremism.

**Table 4.2: Affirmation of Correct Statement in Defining Violent Extremism by Region (%)**

Regions	An act of justification, support and use of violence to achieve a goal normally political, social					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Bono	40.5	25.0	3.6	25.0	4.7	1.2
Bono East	16.0	42.0	2.7	30.7	7.3	1.3
Northern	19.8	35.5	5.0	28.4	8.4	2.9
North East	30.1	44.6	3.6	16.9	4.8	0.0
Oti	25.9	55.3	3.5	10.6	1.2	3.5
Savannah	19.2	62.6	0.0	15.2	2.0	1.0
Upper East	23.2	53.6	3.0	10.9	6.3	3.0
Upper West	23.7	49.1	4.6	9.8	8.7	4.1

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

Regions with a majority of the respondents affirming the correct statement used to describe violent extremism were Savannah (81.8%), Oti (81.2%) and Upper East (76.8%). The regions with the least proportion of study participants affirming the correct statement were the Northern (55.2%) and Bono East (58.0%) regions.

Among the age groups of the primary study respondents, a high proportion (75.2%) of individuals who were in the age category 60 years and above correctly affirmed the correct statement that defines violent extremism. The other age groups who also affirmed the correct statement were 36-59 years (66.5%), 15-17 years (66.2%) and 18-35 years (65.7%). The youthful age group 15-35 years had the lowest proportion (65.8%) of respondents who were able to affirm the correct statement compared to other age categories.

The study also found that PWDs had a relatively lower knowledge (53.6%) of the concept and manifestation of violent extremism than Non-PWDs (67.9%). Approximately six out of every ten herdsmen (61.7%) interviewed were however able to affirm the correct statement.

From the perspective of key informants (KIs), knowledge of violent extremism was well understood. It was mostly defined by them as the use of violence to achieve personal ideologies, political or religious objectives. Some KIs simply expressed the concept of violent extremism as the use of violence to achieve personal ideologies as expressed below:

*“Violent Extremism is when people or a group of people or someone uses violence to achieve their own personal ideologies, be it religion or their understanding of something and he posts it across by use of violence.” - (KI, Security agency, Northern Region).*

Others also described violent extremism as the use of violence to achieve religious objectives as reported by a KI from a Religious Authority.

*“.....These are mostly Islamic groups who feel the teachings and practices of Islam should be universal. They oppose any other religion and views in society. When society resists their proposal, then they are up with arms against anybody who stand in their way.”- (KI, Religious Authority, Upper West Region).*

Generally, the study found that KIs had a better understanding of the concept of violent extremism than the primary participants.

#### 4.2.2 Knowledge of Violent Extremist Groups

A little over a tenth (12.1%) of the primary study participants had heard about violent extremist groups in their districts.

To augment the response by the primary participants, the secondary participants mentioned some of the extremist groups. These include Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Ansarul Islam, Boko Haram, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Jihadist, Taliban and the Tuareg separatist movement.

KIs made mention of Boko Haram as indicated below:

*“Yes, I know one, like the Nigerian Boko Haram. Boko Haram is a Hausa word or expression where “Boko” is a corrupt form of “book” while “Haram” means a “taboo.” They are saying “book” is a taboo so they are against Western Education. Secondly, they are also saying everybody must be Muslim. But that is not what the Quran teaches us. They are just operating in their selfish interest. They go about kidnapping young girls, bombing and killing innocent people.” - (KI, Religious Authority, Bono Region).*

*“Boko Haram- Their main philosophy is that secular education is evil and they want it to be stopped. They also believe that everyone must go by the “Sharia law” which is in Islam. This extremist group is mainly from Nigeria and their members are mainly Muslims hence the application of the Sharia law.” - (KI, Security Agency, Upper East)*


The KIs further mentioned the mode of operation of these groups as through indoctrination, recruitment and luring of innocent people into their movements. Most of the key informants believed that recruitment was their main mode of operation as mentioned by a KI from one of the CSOs.

*“Recruitment is done outside but they have people here who do the recruiting of the members. We don't know for sure but we have heard of people being radicalized in some parts of the Northern Region. Like the incident that happened in 2015, some Ghanaians were recruited into ISIS.” (KI, CSO, Upper East).*

To ascertain the knowledge of the modus operandi of these extremist groups, the primary participants were enquired if they knew of any group within or outside their localities which

promotes objectives such as hatred and discrimination against other groups and persons, violence against other groups or persons and/or reward people for perpetuating violence against other groups or persons.

**Figure 4.1: Percentage distribution showing the existence of groups which incite/promote attributes of violent extremists in the district (%)**




**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

From figure 4.1, 9.7% of primary study participants knew of a group that promotes violence against other groups or persons and another 5.9% knew of a group that rewards people for perpetuating violence against other groups or persons. The key informants corroborated this finding by mentioning groups such as Kandahar Forces, Bolga Bulldogs and Azorkar boys.

#### ***Awareness of Groups or Persons recruiting people to perpetuate Violence***

Although the majority (95.8%) of the primary study participants were not aware of groups or persons recruiting people to perpetuate violence, a relatively smaller proportion (4.2%) were aware of such groups or persons in their locality or district (Figure 4.2).

**Figure 4.2: Awareness of Groups or Persons recruiting people to perpetuate Violence**



**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

Of those who were aware of the groups or persons recruiting people to perpetuate violence in the locality or district, a high proportion of them was from the Bono East region, followed by the Upper East and Northern regions as shown in Figure 4.2. The least proportion was from the North East region.

The 57 (4.2%) primary respondents who were aware of the existence of such groups or persons further indicated how the groups lured people to recruit them and their target category. From their response, people are enticed when provided with monetary gains, promised employment opportunities and provided with expensive gifts as indicated in Table 4.3.

**Table 4.3: Ways groups or persons are lured into recruitment to perpetrate violence**

Ways groups or persons lure others for recruitment	Percent (%)
Providing them with money	59.6
Promising employment opportunities	10.5
Giving them expensive gifts (cars, phones)	8.8
By sponsoring their education	5.3
Promising them a better life abroad	3.5
Assuring them of security and protection	3.5
Providing social services and infrastructure for Communities (boreholes, schools)	1.8
Other	7.0
<b>Total (57)</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

Other reasons cited were the use of threats on the lives of people or that of a family member by their associates.

#### **Support to Extremist groups**

To dismantle violent extremist groups, it is important to cut off the support or assistance given to these groups. To achieve this, it is imperative to know the institution, persons or group of people who are likely to support or give assistance to the extremist groups (Figure 4.3).

**Figure 4.3: Institutions, Persons or Groups likely to support or give assistance to extremist groups (%)**



*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

According to the primary respondents, institutions, persons or groups likely to assist extremist groups included politicians (38.3%), terrorist organizations (28.1%) and security personnel (8.2%). The 1.8% of respondents whose response formed the others category mentioned persons and groups such as traditional leaders, armed robbers and ghetto youth.

### ***Knowledge of individuals in the district recruited by an extremist group***

The study also sought to find out from the primary participants whether they know of any person(s) or individual(s) in their district who have been recruited by an extremist group to perpetuate violence. Twenty-three (1.7%) of them said 'Yes', they know of such an individual. Of this figure, 52.2% were females and 47.8% were males.

Across the study regions, the Northern and Upper East regions recorded the highest figure of 30.4% each (Table 4.4). This was followed by Bono East and Oti regions and then North East and Upper West regions. Two regions, however, did not record such information. They were Savannah and Bono regions.

**Table 4.4: Citizens with knowledge of individuals within selected study regions and districts recruited into extremist groups**

Region	District	No. of respondents
Northern	Gushegu Municipal	1
	Nanumba South	2
	Yendi	1
	Karaga	2
	Sagnarigu Municipal	1
Oti	Krachi East	2
	Nkwanta North	1
Upper East	Bongo	2
	Pusiga	1
	Talensi	4
Upper West	Wa East	1
North East	Bunkpurugu Nakpanduri	2
Bono East	Nkoranza South	3
<b>Total</b>		<b>23</b>

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

In table 4.4, Talensi in the Upper East region and Nkoranza South in the Bono East region recorded the highest number of respondents who knew of individuals recruited into extremist groups.

### ***At-risk groups or individuals who stand the risk of radicalization***

Views were sought from the secondary study participants on individuals or groups who stand the highest risk to be radicalized to promote violent extremism. Key among the groups mentioned were, unemployed youth, Fulanis and women. Forty-nine out of the sixty-seven key informants cited unemployed youth as mentioned by two KIs from the media and civil society as follows.

*“I will say the youth because they are vulnerable. I say this because older persons are too busy with responsibilities to be enticed to partake in such acts of violence or to promote violent extremism. Secondly, the youth are vulnerable because most of them are idle without anything to keep them busy because they are unemployed. These political parties or candidates can stoop so low as even distributing drinks for the youth to get their support or even to do their bidding. See err... if the youth had well-paid jobs, they would not need to engage in such practices.” - (KI, Media, Bono Region)*

*“The youth because if you look at our free school concept it contributes to the possibility of every youth going to school but there hadn’t been a structure for most of them to get a job after school and once people are not employed, the tendency of doing everything is high so when there is violent extremism they can be affected.” - (KI, CSO, Bono East)*

Additionally, some KIs mentioned women (particularly those with sound education and economic status) as part of the at-risk group as cited by a representative from a CSO in the Upper East region.

*“... There are instances in which women, high profile women who have gone far in education... even from France with a North African background were radicalized... So we can't leave out any group... We can all be radicalized because if they come and give you some huge amount of money you will be happy to add it to what you already have ...” - (KI, CSO, Upper East Region)*

Similar to the assertion of the key informants, 91.2% of the 57 primary participants who were aware of the existence of groups or persons recruiting people to perpetuate violence in the locality or district mentioned the unemployed youth as the category of people targeted to be recruited to perpetuate violence. A few of them mentioned traditional leaders (3.5%), women (1.8%) and opinion leaders (1.8%). One (1.8%) respondent however did not respond to the question.


### **4.2.3 Knowledge of the Existence of Violent Extremist Activities**

Although Ghana has not experienced any violent extremist acts, the study assessed whether respondents had ever heard of or witnessed violent extremist acts in their district within the last 12 months. Whilst a little over one-fifth (22.7%) of the participants have heard of violent extremist acts in their districts, five out of every hundred (5.1%) participants had witnessed the act (Figure 4.4).

The few (69, 5.1%) respondents who had witnessed the violent extremist act further indicated how prevalent the act occurred in the district using likert scales such as very often, sometimes, seldom and never.



**Figure 4.4: Prevalence of Violent Extremist Activities in the districts (%)**



**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

Of the 69 primary respondents who had witnessed violent extremist acts in their districts, a majority (75.4%) indicated that the act occurred occasionally. Another, 13.0% of them said the act occurred very often whilst 11.6% said it seldomly occurred.

Although an overwhelming majority (94.9%) of the study respondents indicated that they had not witnessed any violent extremist acts in their districts, close to 50%, believed that there will come a time when Ghana will experience an extremist attack. Reasons cited for this assertion included the fact that Ghana shares borders with countries which have experienced violent extremist activities with these borders being generally porous. Others were also of the view that the high cost of living in the country may lure people to engage in violent extremist activities.

In line with the findings from the community members, most KIs (51/67) emphasized the non-existence of violent extremism activity in the region/district, as emphasized by some KIs in the security agencies.

*"I can't say we have that one happening here because they are not operating here in Ghana but the extremist activities of the jihadist happening in Burkina Faso affect us." - (KI, Security Agency, Upper East)*

*"No, in Bono region there hasn't been any violent extremism activity happening." - (KI, Security Agency, Bono)*

A few of them however asserted the existence of violent extremism activities in the regions/districts due to the existence of members of these groups in the district as indicated by a KI in the security agency.

*"We equally have for the tribal extremist group, a Fulani cell, that we discovered in a place called Dihari, after Savelugu. They are all Fulani's coming from various parts of the country, but they were only learning Koran and the community in which they were staying, the indigenes of those communities don't go to where they are staying. It is only the Fulanis alone you see in that particular vicinity. And we traced them and realized that some of them have links with the Maghreb terrorists in Mali. We wrote a report to Accra and ... the national security had to come in and they were all taken to Accra. I think when they even tracked one of them, their lines, on the Whatsapp group he indicated to the other group in Mali*

*that they should take him off from the Whatsapp group because the authorities in Ghana are tracking him. And so, this is one group that was active here in the region. ... We went there a couple of times and were able to gather about sixty of them ...” (KI, Security Agency, Northern Region).*

### 4.3 Attitudes and Behaviours of Community Members and At-Risk groups towards Violent Extremism

This sub-section addresses the attitudes and behaviours of communities and at-risk groups towards violent extremism. To assess behaviours, indicators used were motivation to join extremist groups and factors that influence support for extremist groups. To measure attitude, some attitudinal indicators were espoused for the participants to remark on.

#### 4.3.1 Motivation to join violent extremist groups

The primary study participants outlined several factors that could motivate people to join violent extremist groups. Key among them were unemployment (35.9%), financial gains (29.3%) and political and socio-economic marginalization (6.3%) (Table 4.5).

**Table 4.5: Motivation to join violent extremist groups**

Motivating factors	Percent (%)
Unemployment	35.9
Financial gain	29.3
Political and socioeconomic marginalization	6.3
Bad governance	4.0
Injustice	3.5
Inequality	2.8
Lack of tolerance	2.7
Adventure	1.8
Unresolved conflicts	1.8
Religious suppression	1.7
Corruption	1.6
Alienation	1.5
Human rights violations by the Police/Military	0.7
Lack of opportunity to voice out grievances	0.2
Don't know	4.4
Others (Peer influence, intimidation)	1.8
<b>Total (1,351)</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

A few of the respondents mentioned human rights violations by police/military (0.7%) and lack of opportunity to voice out grievances (0.2%).

The subject of poverty as a push factor to engage in violent extremism was also eloquently espoused by a KI from a security agency.

*“Poverty is a motivating factor because when you are hungry and someone gives you food for free for months or years, you will automatically succumb to whatever he asks you to do. Unemployment and risky adventures might motivate people to engage in violent extremist acts.”- (KI, Security Agency, Savannah Region).*

Other motivational factors mentioned were marginalization and the belief in the ideology of extremist groups as mentioned respectively by KIs in the Upper West and Bono East regions.

*“The unending cycle of neglect and poverty. Several governments have neglected the developmental needs of the region. Since the return to democracy, the region has not had its fair share of the national cake and that makes most people feel left out of national development.”- (KI, Traditional Authority, Upper West region)*

*“... when they believe in the ideology of these preachers, people joining because of ideology are more fateful than people motivated by money if the money doesn't come, they don't join but with the ideology, it is a do or die affair.”- (KI, Security Agency, Bono East Region)*

### 4.3.2 Factors influencing the support of Violent Extremist groups

From the study results, the primary drivers that could lead some groups or persons to support violent extremist groups included personal enrichment, corruption and poor performance by governments not addressing the needs of its people (Table 4.6).

**Table 4.6: Factors influencing support for Violent Extremist groups**

Factors	Frequency	Percent (%)
Personal Enrichment	566	41.9
Corruption	237	17.5
Poor performance of government to meet the needs of people	214	15.8
Government mistreatment or injustices experienced	107	7.9
Religious beliefs	90	6.7
Coercion/fear of extremist groups	25	1.9
Don't know	98	7.3
Other	14	1.0
Total	1351	100

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

A few participants mentioned religious beliefs (6.7%) and coercion/fear of extremist groups (1.9%). Some of the responses which fell within the other category were peer influence, drug addiction and lack of tolerance.

#### 4.3.3 Attitude of Community Members toward the Fight against Violent Extremism

Generally, primary study participants demonstrated a positive attitude in the fight against violent extremism. When respondents were asked what they would do if they happen to know that a family member or close friend is expressing interest in joining an extremist group, close to eight out of every ten (77.1%) said they will advise him/her to desist from joining. Another 19.5% were ready to report the person to security agencies whereas 1.9% of them said they would do nothing about the situation. Interestingly, eleven (0.8%) primary study participants said they would encourage him/her to join the extremist group.

On the contrary, a relatively small number of the community members were ready to encourage their family members or close friend to join violent extremist groups. Of the eleven who affirmed this position, five (5) persons each was in the age bracket of 18-35 and 36-59 years. One person was aged 16 years old, an apprentice with no formal education.

Across gender, there were more males (54.5%) than females (45.5%) who affirmed that they would encourage others to join extremist groups. Regionally, of the eleven who stated this position, a high proportion of them were from the Upper East region (36.3%), followed by Northern (27.3%) and Upper West (18.2%) regions. One respondent (9.1%) each was from the Bono and Bono East regions.

Subsequently, the four respondents from the Upper East region comprise a respondent each from the following districts; Bolgatanga Central, Kassena Nankana Municipal, Kassena Nankana West and Talensi. From the Northern region was a respondent each from the Sagnarigu, Tamale Metropolitan and Tolon. The Upper West region had a respondent each from the Wa East and Nadowli-Kaleo districts. In addition, a respondent from the Dormaa West district in the Bono region and another from the Nkoranza South district from the Bono East region asserted this fact.

The second attitudinal indicator was premised on the statement, “In the context of insecurity in Ghana, imagine that you are approached and offered an interesting financial proposal by someone who seems suspicious or is part of a suspicious group in exchange for your help. Please indicate if it is very likely, likely, unlikely or very unlikely that you would personally do the following in this situation”. The indicators were: try to avoid contact with that person, consult a friend or family member, try to learn more about the offer, contact the official authorities, consult a community leader or access the money and offer the help. Table 4.7, presents respondents' views on the indicators given.

**Table 4.7: Attitude towards Suspicious Financial Offers**

Attitudinal Indicators	Responses (%)				No. of Respondents
	Very Likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very Unlikely	
Try to avoid contact with that person	37.3	38.8	13.8	10.1	1351
Consult a friend or family member	28.2	49.1	15.6	7.1	1351
Try to learn more about the offer	15.7	34.3	28.5	21.5	1351
Contact the official authorities (e.g., the security forces)	42.4	37.5	12.9	7.2	1351
Consult a community leader	29.8	51.3	12.1	6.8	1351
Access the money and offer the help	5.6	12.3	26.2	55.9	1351

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

The indicators comprise five positive and one negative statement. Of the negative statement; 'will access the money and offer help', 82.1% of participants are unlikely to carry out such an act. On the statement, try to learn more about the offer, participants' views were divided, whilst half of them will likely to enquire about the offer, the other half declined to enquire about the offer. Generally, over 70.0% of participants affirmed the other four positive statements as depicted in the table.

#### 4.4 Knowledge of Other Forms of Violence

The study found that, within the last twelve months preceding the survey, 20.9% of study participants had witnessed acts of violence apart from violent extremism in the study districts. From Table 4.8, more males than females had ever witnessed other forms of violence in the district over the past twelve months and those within the youth age bracket 15-35 years had the highest proportion of participants.

**Table 4.8: Age and Sex distribution of participants who have ever witnessed other violent acts (%)**

Variable	Ever witnessed other forms of violence in the district over the past 12 months	
	Yes	No
<b>Sex of Participants</b>		
Male	23.3	76.7
Female	18.5	81.5
<b>Age Group</b>		
15-17 years	31.0	69.0
18-35 years	20.7	79.3
36-59 years	22.2	77.8
60 and above	12.4	87.6

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

Regionally, 39.3% of participants in the Bono East region had ever witnessed other forms of violence in the district apart from violent extremism.

**Table: 4.9: Regional distribution of respondents who witnessed other violent acts (%)**

Region	Yes	No	
Bono	17.9	82.1	
Bono East	39.3	60.7	
Northern	16.6	83.4	
North East	33.7	66.3	
Oti	10.6	89.4	
Savannah	28.3	71.7	
Upper East	19.8	80.2	
Upper West	13.9	86.1	

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

Oti region had the least proportion of 10.6% of respondents who had ever engaged in other forms of violence.

Similarly, some KIs reported of witnessing other forms of violence in the district or region. Key among the violence mentioned were chieftaincy conflicts, ethnic conflicts and land disputes.

*“Bawku chieftaincy conflict is an example. This chieftaincy conflict is between the Kusasis and Mamprusis which is mainly about legitimacy, it is all about who owns Bawku. Also, because of similar customs or culture, other ethnic groups are in*

*support of one of the two like Moshis who may be supporting the Mamprusis with logistics in the Chieftaincy wars. On a sad note, over 70 lives have been lost in this conflict.” - (KI, Security Agency)*

*“Violent conflicts among ethnic groups. It was among three intra-ethnic groups. The Bimoba tribe fought against another part of the Bimoba tribe, Tamung versus Puri and Tamung versus Bauk.” - (KI, CSO, region???)*


*“Also, the Kokomba vrs Bimoba. Violent conflicts are also in Chereponi. One had to do with land ... It was mostly about farmlands.” - ( KI, CSO, region)*

#### 4.4.2 Behaviours of Community Members towards other forms of violence

Behaviours of community members were established from their involvement in acts of violence. From the study, 3.4% of citizens had ever engaged in acts of violence (Figure 4.5). This represents a 0.1% reduction from the NCCE 2021 Risk Analysis study where 3.5% of citizens reported to have ever engaged in violent acts.

Male participants (4.7%) were found to have ever involved in violent acts compared to females (2.1%). Though not statistically significant, the data revealed that the younger population tends to engage in acts of violence compared to the older population as depicted in figure 4.5

**Figure 4.5: Age distribution of Respondents who had ever engaged in violent acts (%)**



**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

Table 4.10 presents the regional proportions of individuals who had ever engaged in other forms of violence aside from violent extremism. The Upper West region had the highest proportion (6.9%) of participants followed by the Bono East region (6.7%).

**Table 4.10: Respondents who had ever engaged in violent acts by region (%)**

Region	Yes	No
Bono	2.4	97.6
Bono East	6.7	93.3
Northern	2.7	97.3
North East	0.0	100.0
Oti	2.4	97.6
Savannah	0.0	100.0
Upper East	3.4	96.6
Upper West	6.9	93.1

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

North East and Savanna regions were the regions with no participants reported to have ever engaged in violence (Table 4.10).

Participants who had ever engaged in any form of violent act went further to indicate the type of acts they had engaged in. Some acts mentioned were election-related violence, land disputes, chieftaincy disputes, school riots, domestic violence, ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts and inter-communal clashes.

Reasons cited for engagement in the violent acts included the demand for their rights, fight for better living conditions, and for their voices to be heard.

The study also explored study participants' knowledge of the various European Union funded intervention programs on violence prevention among secondary participants. Participants fairly demonstrated their awareness of such interventions.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### COMMUNITIES' LEVEL OF TOLERANCE TOWARDS DIVERSE GROUPS

#### 5.1 Introduction

In today's world, where globalization and migration have become an inevitable reality, the issue of tolerance towards different groups in society is critical to promoting social harmony, peaceful coexistence, and national development. Indeed, several factors have been identified to influence the level of tolerance towards different groups in societies. These include cultural and religious beliefs, socio-economic characteristics, exposure to diversity, and political affiliations (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2019).

Ghana is known for its diverse ethnic and cultural heritage, with over 100 ethnic groups, and varied religious beliefs. While diversity is celebrated in Ghana, discrimination and unfair treatment towards different groups persist. This chapter presents study participants' views on communities' level of tolerance towards different groups with specific emphasis on three broad themes. These are discrimination with respect to persons of different linguistics, religious and political backgrounds, level of existence of violence in the community, and the tolerance of persons of different linguistics, religious and political groups. Additionally, the chapter also presents a measurement of the overall scores of communities' levels of tolerance towards different religious and linguistic groups.

These results are presented from the perspectives of primary participants in the survey, and interviews with key informants (KII) from the state and non-state institutions in the selected project districts and regions.


#### 5.2 Discrimination with respect to persons of different linguistics, religious, and political groups

In evaluating this broad theme, study participants were assessed on three main sub-themes namely; witnessing cases of denial of access to a public facility, witnessing cases of unfair treatment of persons in their community, and how often they have been discriminated against or harassed.

##### 5.2.1 Witnessing cases of denial of access to a public facility

On this, study participants were asked to indicate "Yes" or "No. Of the 1351 primary participants, between 88.1 percent and 95.4% reported that they had never witnessed a situation where persons were denied access to public facilities due to their disability status, political affiliation, ethnicity, nationality, gender and religious affiliation respectively (Figure 5.1). However, the commonly cited cases of being denied access to public facilities were due to disability status (11.9%) and political affiliation (10.0%).

**Figure 5.1: Respondents' feedback on witnessing a situation where someone was denied access to a public facility**



**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**


By region, the Upper East region recorded 40.0% and the Northern region had 20% of participants who have witnessed instances where persons with disabilities (PWDs) were denied access to a public facility. This suggests that persons with disabilities in Ghana continue to face significant barriers to accessing public facilities and highlights the need for greater efforts to address disability discrimination and promote disability rights in Ghana.

### 5.2.2 Witnessing cases of unfair treatment of persons

Similarly, study participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they have witnessed the unfair treatment of individuals in their district based on factors such as ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, disability status, gender, and nationality.

Generally, between 77.4 percent and 93.4% of study participants had never witnessed any instance of unfair treatment meted on anyone in their locality based on the aforementioned factors (Figure 5.2). The results further showed that discrimination based on religious affiliation (6.6%) and nationality (6.8%) were relatively low compared to other factors. For instance, the highest proportion of respondents who have witnessed unfair treatment based on disability status was 22.6 percent followed by political affiliation (15.8%), and ethnicity (12.3%).

**Figure 5.2: Feedback on witnessing cases of unfair treatment of individuals in the district**




Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023

### 5.2.3 Prevalence of discrimination or harassment

The survey also sought from primary participants how often they have personally been discriminated against or harassed based on ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, disability status, and gender. Majority of the participants reported that they had never experienced discrimination or harassment based on any of the factors listed, with the highest proportion being religious affiliation (91.9.0%), followed by gender (90.9%).

**Figure 5.3: Participants' feedback on how often they have been discriminated or harassed**



Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023

Interestingly, thirty-four out of the sixty-seven (34/67) key informants interviewed also confirmed that generally there was no discrimination along the factors aforementioned particularly gender and religion in their regions. For instance, a traditional leader had this to say on the non-discrimination of people based on gender

*“it used to happen until I became a chief and advocated that women should be included in chieftaincy”- (KI, Traditional Authority, Upper East Region)*

Another informant had this to say on non-existence of discrimination along religious lines

*“..... there is no discrimination. Everyone is allowed to pray. If you are a Catholic or if you are a Christian, you can have your church. If you are a Muslim, you can go to your mosque. So, we don't have those problems here. We don't discriminate against one another base on one's religion” (KI, Religious Authority, Upper West)*


In contrast, a notable proportion of participants reported experiencing discrimination or harassment at least once based on their ethnicity, political affiliation, disability status, or gender (Figure 5.3). Of particular concern is the proportion of participants who reported that they had never been discriminated against or harassed based on their disability status (23.8%) while the least reported was by religion (8.1%). This highlights the need for greater awareness and action to address discrimination against persons with disabilities in Ghana, particularly, in these eight (8) projects regions.

Further analysis by sex showed that females (59.8%) were more likely to be discriminated against based on their gender as compared to their male counterparts (40.2%). In terms of disability status, more men (62.5%) than women (37.5%) were more likely to be discriminated against.

### 5.3 Level of existence of violence in communities

The level of existence of violence in study participants' communities and districts was measured along the lines of five main themes, which were political polarization, religious intolerance, ethnic conflict, chieftaincy fractions and land/boundary disputes. Study participants rated the level of existence of violence on a 3-point Likert scale namely exist with violence, exist but not with violence, and does not exist. Figure 5.4 displays participants' perceived level of existence of violence in their districts.

**Figure 5.4: Participants' response on perceived level of existence of violence in their districts**



**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

It was evident that a significant proportion of the respondents believed that the aforementioned themes did not exist in their communities. Whereas religious intolerance was the highest (68.7%), the least proportion was political polarization (34.6%). The proportions of participants who believed that these issues exist with violence were recorded for chieftaincy fractions (22.4%), followed by land/boundary disputes (22.3%), political polarization (17.5%), and ethnic conflict (13.6%).

Findings from the key informant interviews corroborated the survey results on the issue of violence in communities. A 20/67 key informants confirmed that chieftaincy and land disputes were dominant violence-related issues in their communities. These were most pronounced in the Northern and North East regions of the country.

On the issue of chieftaincy disputes, some participants cited how two persons are fighting over the position while in another case, the dispute is over a borehole. One participant from the Security agency in the Northern region averred that:

*"It exists with a lot of violence. Chieftaincy issues are very rampant, we have two chiefs fighting in Tamale. We have another chief fighting in a district under Savelugu that was last year over a borehole. Last month we had an issue with the Karaga chief installation that, there was a problem there. There is a chieftaincy issue, especially after the death of a chief, it brings a lot of problems"- (KII, Security Agency, Northern region)*

The installation of chiefs to the dislike of their subjects is also a ground for violence. Another factor buttressing this also has to do with lack or improper document of the process of installing of chiefs. Another informant from a Civil Society Organisation in North East region revealed:

*“It exists with violence a lot. In the Bunkpurugu and Nakpanduri chieftaincy conflicts. Sayeluguu chief was killed. Chereponi also has chieftaincy issues among the Konkombas. What brings about these chieftaincy issues is injustice. Sometimes the kingmaker enskins chiefs whom the people do not want. I believe the main problem is the fact that the communities do not have a well-structured document that has been laid down about how or who to become the chief. It is not spelt out correctly. I think there should be a criterion for becoming a chief” - (KI, CSO, North East region)*

On land disputes, the claim for territory beyond one's boundary was the root cause of violence. A security agency in the Upper East region had this to say:


*“There is one between two towns in Kassena-Nankani East Municipal. These two towns are namely Doba and Kandiga and they have been fighting over a piece of land. There is a river called the Anayari river which separates these two towns. However, Doba does not agree to this and they claim their territory goes beyond the river” - (KII, Security Agency, Upper East region)*

Figure 5.4 further revealed issues that exist but are not violent such as political polarization, which had the highest proportion of participants (47.8%) who believed it exists without violence. The lowest proportion was recorded for religious intolerance (27.4%). This finding suggests that political polarization is a common issue in Ghana, but it does not necessarily lead to violent conflicts. Furthermore, the proportion of participants who believe that these social issues do not exist in their community is highest for religious intolerance (68.7%) and lowest for political polarization (34.6%) (Figure 5.4).

#### **5.4. Living with individuals from different backgrounds as neighbours**

The concept of neighbourliness is an essential aspect of community living and is key to peaceful coexistence. To this end, the survey sought from study primary participants whether they would like to have individuals from different religious, ethnic, and political backgrounds as their neighbours. The result is presented in Figure 5.5.

**Figure 5.5: Responses on having individuals from different backgrounds as neighbours**



**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

The survey results showed that the majority of participants would like to have individuals from different religious, ethnic, and political backgrounds as their neighbours (Figure 5.5). Over 77.8 percent of participants stated that they would like individuals of different religious backgrounds as neighbours and 80.2 percent would like individuals of another ethnic group as neighbours. On political affiliations, the majority of participants (81.0%) would like to have individuals belonging to other political parties as neighbours. This is a positive finding as it indicates that individuals are willing to coexist and interact with people from different religious, ethnic and political backgrounds respectively.

Additionally, while 15.9 percent, 14.6 percent and 14.1 percent of participants would not mind having people of different religions, ethnic groups and political parties as neighbours, a small proportion of participants indicated otherwise (Figure 5.5). The proportion of 5.8, 4.3 and 3.7 of participants specified they would dislike living with individuals of different religious backgrounds, another ethnic group and those belonging to other political parties respectively.

On gender basis, while women were more likely to dislike having people of different religions (61.5%) and ethnic groups (60.3%) as neighbours, men were more likely to dislike people from other political parties (54.0%) as neighbours.

## 5.5 Overall level of Tolerance

This section of the report presents the individual indicators of tolerance level, and the assessment of the overall tolerance level of study participants in the eight project regions. This was done using three (3) indicators (Table 5.1).

Generally, the study's primary participants reported a high level of tolerance across the three indicators with an overall score of tolerance level of 82.6 percent. This suggests that study participants have a largely positive attitude towards diversity and inclusion, with high levels of tolerance for individuals from different groups and backgrounds.

**Table 5.1: Overall score on tolerance level**

Criteria	Average Score(%)
Co-existence with different groups of people	87.6
Non-Existence of Violence	68.6
Non-discrimination based on socio-political background	91.8
<b>Overall score of tolerance level</b>	<b>82.6</b>

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

Table 5.1 highlighted that 91.8 percent of participants have never been discriminated against or harassed based on their socio-political, while the non-existence of violence in communities was 68.6 percent. In spite of that, one in every three participants (31.4%) indicated the existence of violence in their communities.

### 5.5.1 Level of tolerance by regions

Overall, there were variations in the level of tolerance across the study regions, with some regions reporting higher levels of tolerance than others. The region with the highest overall tolerance level was Oti, with an average score of 84.8% while the North East had the lowest average score of 77.9% (Table 5.2).

In terms of individual indicators, the region with the highest percentage of participants reporting high levels of tolerance for co-existence with different groups as neighbours was North East (90.4%). On the non-existence of violence, the Oti region recorded the highest percentage (84.5%) while North East recorded the least with 50.8%. (Table 5.2).

**Table 5.2: Average level of tolerance by region (%)**

Region	Co-existence with different groups as neighbours	Non-Existence of Violence	Non-discrimination based on socio-political background	Overall average score of tolerance
Bono East	88.4	69.9	91.3	83.2
Bono	89.3	73.7	92.5	85.2
North East	90.4	50.8	92.5	77.9
Northern	89.5	69.2	91.0	83.2
Oti	79.5	84.5	90.4	84.8
Savannah	88.6	64.9	94.8	82.8
Upper East	85.6	64.6	90.2	80.1
Upper West	85.8	72.2	94.5	84.2

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*



A further analysis for study respondents' level of tolerance for different religious and linguistic groups was assessed using the same indicators used for the general assessment of tolerance. The overall tolerance level along religious and ethnic lines was 86.2%.

**Table 5.3: Overall level of tolerance towards different religious and linguistic groups**

CRITERIA	AVERAGE SCORE (%)
Co-existence with different religious and ethnic groups	86.4
Non-Existence of religious intolerance and ethnic conflict	79.8
Non-discrimination along ethnic and religious lines	92.5
<b>Overall score of tolerance level</b>	<b>86.2</b>

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

**Table 5.4: Level of tolerance towards different religion and linguistics groups by region (%)**

Religion	Co-existence with different religious and ethnic groups	Non-Existence of religious intolerance and ethnic conflict	Non-discrimination along ethnic and religious lines	Overall average score
BONO EAST	89.8	82.4	91.0	87.7
BONO	88.8	95.7	93.1	92.5
NORTH EAST	87.6	65.0	94.8	82.5
NORTHERN	89.1	76.2	91.0	85.4
OTI	75.8	91.8	89.6	85.7
SAVANNAH	89.6	72.2	93.5	85.1
UPPER EAST	85.6	71.7	90.7	82.7
UPPER WEST	84.5	83.7	96.3	88.2

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

Across the study regions, Bono recorded the highest level (92.5%) of tolerance across the diverse religious and linguistic groups. Upper West and Bono East followed in that order (Table 5.4). Although high, North East recorded the lowest of respondents who were ready to tolerate people of different linguistic and religious backgrounds.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONTRIBUTION OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN GHANA

#### 6.1 Introduction

Violent extremism and terrorism have evolved into serious threats to international peace and security, with severe consequences for human security and safety, as well as national stability and development (Adarkwah, 2020). As a result, the menace has evolved into a transnational threat that necessitates both international and national responses. Due to the increased violent activities of notable terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, the Sahara Branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), among others in the sub-region, Ghana has increased its efforts towards combating terrorism in the country. To ensure an effective and long-term national response to the phenomenon, Ghana developed The National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana, which aims to harmonise and ensure cooperation and collaboration among security forces operating within the country, as well as establish the responsibilities of the various stakeholders and define their specific functions (MNS, 2019).

This chapter presents the roles of various state institutions including Security Agencies (Ghana Police Service, Ghana Immigration Service, Ghana Armed Forces, Customs Division of Ghana Revenue Authority and the National Intelligence Bureau) and the Media, and Non-State institutions such as CSOs and Faith-based organizations in the fight against Violent Extremism in Ghana, as spelt out by the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana. It further outlines feedback received from the key informants on the contributions of these institutions to the fight against violent extremism. The perspectives of the primary respondents on the subject is also presented. The chapter ends with feedback received from the key informants on appropriate ways to deal with the menace.

#### 6.2 Nationally determined roles of State and Non-State institutions in fighting Violent Extremism in Ghana

The National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAFPCVET) clearly stipulates the roles of key state and non-state institutions in addressing violent extremism in Ghana. Box 1 outlines the specified roles of key institutions contacted for this study.

## Box 1: Roles and Responsibilities of State and Non-State Institutions in the fight against violent Extremism

NO.	STATE INSTITUTIONS	INSTITUTIONS ROLE
1	<b>Ghana Police Service (GPS)</b>	The GPS is the lead agency responsible for maintaining law and order and preventing crime. They are the first responder in the four pillars of the NAFPCVET with other security agencies. In conjunction with the NIB, RD, NIS, GIS, GCAA, GMA, NIA, NCSC, the GPS will update the crime registry and store information digitally to ensure that firearms and explosives are not illegally imported and used in the country. Also, in collaboration with the Ministry of Communications, Finance and Defence, they shall develop mechanisms to control the activities of cybercriminals.
2	<b>Ghana Armed Forces (GAF)</b>	The GAF will establish a robust Counter Terrorism Unit and coordinate with other security agencies to support the NAFPCVET in the event of a terrorist attack that may exceed the capacity of civil response. They will use the Defence Intelligence to complement the CT effort of the NIB, GIS, RD and MOD and other lead agencies for the collation of military-related intelligence within and outside the country. The GAF will also use Defence Advisers to gather intelligence on suspected extremist and terror related activities in Ghana.
3	<b>National Intelligence Bureau</b>	The NIB is responsible for collecting and collating information and intelligence on internal security, preventing and detecting violent extremism and terror-related crimes. The agency will reactivate and revive the crime registry and collaborate with the Ministry of Information and NCTC to develop public enlightenment programmes to sensitize the public.

4	<b>Ghana Immigration Service (GIS)</b>	The GIS will control and monitor immigration activities at all entry and exit points in the country, complementing internal security efforts through effective manning of major entry points and patrolling of land borders. The GIS will register foreign house helps and construction workers in the country and monitor and control refugees and refugee camps.
5	<b>Ghana Revenue Authority-Customs Division (GRA-CD)</b>	The GRA-CD will collaborate with other agencies to prevent the illegal importation of weapons and drugs, including toxic and hazardous substances. GRA-CD first-hand provides intelligence on importation and export trends to help contain terrorist threats.
6	<b>National Communications Authority (NCA-Media)</b>	The NCA is responsible for regulating telecommunication services in Ghana to ensure efficient use of radio frequency spectrum, detect, disrupt and deter unauthorized use, expand the national call centre, and re-invigorate and apply regulations for National Communications. The NCA must ensure the National Digital Terrestrial Television Transmission Network is secure, reliable and available.
	<b>NON-STATE INSTITUTIONS</b>	<b>INSTITUTIONS ROLE</b>
7	<b>Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)</b>	The CSOs are to engage in outreach activities and proactive steps to address the root causes of terrorism, promote dialogue and tolerance, provide policy advice and expertise, and are to mobilize and educate the public on how to respond to emergency security situations.
8	<b>Chieftaincy and Faith-based Institutions</b>	The Faith-based organizations will support the NAFPCVET with programmes to educate the community members on the implications of violent extremism and solicit the support of relevant agencies and organizations to prevent radicalization of the youth and vulnerable in the communities, churches and mosques.

**Source:** Ministry of National Security, Ghana, 2019

## 6.3 Contributions of State Actors and Non-Actors in addressing Violent Extremism

The section outlines how the state and non-state actors contribute to the fight against violent extremism in practice as well as the existence of focal persons spearheading activities related to violent extremism in these institutions.

### 6.3.1 Contribution of State Institutions

#### 6.3.1.1 Security Agencies (GPS, GIS, GRA-CD, GAF, NIB)

Generally, the key informants mentioned three major ways security agencies are involved in fighting the menace of violent extremism. These were, intelligence gathering, collaborations and the establishment of institutional structures to deal with the risk and threat of violent extremism in the regions. These are outlined as follows:

**Intelligence Gathering:** On this, the key informants indicated that they gather intelligence on security issues for dissemination to other security agencies. This conforms to their function outlined in the NAFPCVET Framework (MNS, 2019) which requires security agencies to gather information and intelligence on internal security, prevent and detect violent extremism and terror-related crimes. Some key informants expressed this as follows;

*“Yes, our roles as internal intelligence agency is basically to gather intelligence, gather information activities of these groups, saboteurs, people who are undermining or planning to undermine the welfare of the state and quickly relay the information to the appropriate security agencies. We are everywhere be it at the political front or chieftaincy front. We monitor and report happenings to required authorities. The main role here is to gather intelligence and send it to the appropriate authorities”. (KI, Security Agency, Oti)*

*“We are not frontline security we are always at the back. Ours is to provide intelligence to preempt. Since I came here, I have profiled the NGO’s. When communities lack water and light and an NGO comes in to provide the social amenities they need to be monitored because these are the same things that are used to lure them to their side. So, we monitor the NGOs who are into this”. (KI Security Agency, Bono East Region)*

*“Early warning signals. We do have security meetings at the regional level so we are sometimes aware of some issues before they happened. For example, with the Buipe chieftaincy violence, we picked early warning signals and warned the chief not go ahead to enskin the Fulani man as a sub-chief but he refused and it led to violence with properties damaged”. (Security Agency, Savannah)*

**Establishment of institutional structures:** With regard to this, some security agencies indicated the existence of established structures in their institutions to deal with insecurity in the regions. This was in the form of units/regiments in place to deal with extremist activities as well as the regular deployment of security officers to vantage positions to detect threats of violent extremism.

*“We have what we call the rapid counter-terrorism intelligence team around so in case there is such an attack this unit will respond to extremist attacks. Since most of these extremist groups are in our neighbouring countries, we have the people in charge of this at our borders”. (Security Agency, Northern Region)*

*“We have a unit called “The 66 Regiment” who follow up or monitor these extremist activities and also oversee Oti and Volta regions. They are usually deployed when matters such as extremism activities are happening in any part of the region.” (Security agency, Oti region)*

**Collaborations:** The key informants mentioned that, they collaborate with other institutions and stakeholders in the fight against violent extremism. This corroborates with the functions enshrined in the NAFPVET that charges some security agencies to collaborate with others to fight violent extremism. The following statements were made by some key informants;

*“We collaborate with other security agencies such as Immigration, the Military, Police and other stakeholders to safeguard the various borders in Ghana to help fight against violent extremism. Every year our organization also selects a number of persons to help other security agencies in the fight against violent extremism”(KI, Security Agency, Bono Region).*

*“We are in collaboration with the National Security Agency to fight against violent extremism attacks”. (KI, Security Agency, Upper East)*

### 6.3.1.2 Media

According to section 2.12 of the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana, the media is mandated to use their platforms (print and electronic, local and national TV, and community radio stations) to educate the citizenry about extremism and methods of recruitment. The key informants from the media emphasized this as their role in the fight against violent extremism.

**Education and Sensitization:** According to the key informants, the role of the media is to educate and sensitize the public on issues related to violent extremism. The following voices depict the perspectives of some study participants.

*“As a radio station, we pave way for institutions to use our medium to sensitize the public on the threats of violent extremism. This morning, the Regional Director of NCCE Bono East region was here to educate the public on Violent extremism. Also from our own programs, when we hear of any violence in the communities, we condemn such acts using our medium”. (Media, Bono East Region)*

*“As an institution, we conduct educational talks, and run news items and programs to encourage and teach people how to live peacefully with each other. This morning show and a magazine show called “Kose Kose” are also platforms where educational talks are shared”. (KI, Media, Bono Region)*

### 6.3.2 Non-State Institutional Response to the Risk and Threat of Violent Extremism

This section presents feedback received from key informants on the contribution of non-state actors to fighting the menace. These institutions include religious and traditional authorities as well as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

#### 6.3.2.1 Religious/Traditional Authorities

Religious and traditional authorities wield considerable power in Ghanaian society. As a result, it is expected that they use local mechanisms and religious teachings to instil traditional and moral values in their people to maintain peace and peaceful co-existence between and among communities. Key traditional and religious leaders affirmed this as their role in responding to the risk and threat of violent extremism.

**Teaching and Counseling:** On this, the key informants indicated that, their institutions have been involved in the teaching and counselling of their members on the importance of ensuring peaceful co-existence in communities. This was expressed as follows by some informants;

*“The only testimony I can give is that we often preach peace in the 5 mosques in Sunyani. We teach the importance of peace and why togetherness is needed. Allah even said in the Quran that when we come together, we are strong but when we are divided, we are weak. The only thing that can make us come together is peace” (KI, Religious Authority, Bono Region)*

*“During our congregation on Fridays, we give sermons and advice and we even ask for alms to help people in the community”. (KI, Religious Authority, North East)*

**Membership in Committees and Serving as Agents of Peace:** On this, the key informants mentioned the existence of peace agents and committees that help to promote and build peace in the various communities.

*“Also, we have our community peace agents who are responsible for ensuring peace in the community”. (KI, Religious Authority, Upper East)*

*“We set up committees for justice and peace who help in building peace in our communities”. (KI Religious Authority, Upper East)*

From the perspectives of traditional authorities, traditional and religious leaders usually settle disputes and other related conflicts and violent cases in their respective jurisdictions.

**Dispute Resolution:** On this, the traditional authorities indicated that, the chiefs and Imams in the communities are involved in settling disputes and grievances related to violence. This was expressed as follows;

*“We have Chiefs in the community. We also have Imams in every mosque apart from the Chief Imam. So everywhere an issue arises the Chief or Imam of that place is made to address the issue over there. If the issue is too difficult to handle, we have an Imam board that can address the issue”. (KI, Bono East Region)*



*“Whatever the grievances are, bring them on board, and we will be able to address it and in cases where they are unable to heed and violence break out, they send a delegation to calm things down and to bring them together for a discussion”. (KI, Traditional Authority, Northern Region)*

*“We serve as mediators in solving issues and problems in the district”. (KI, Traditional Authority, Upper East)*

### 6.3.2.2 Civil Society Organizations

Civil Society organizations are expected to contribute to the risk and threat of violent extremism by educating the youth and vulnerable groups about the dangers associated with extremism and how to counter the negative narratives in targeted communities. The study found a number of Civil Society Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations involved in activities related to the fight against violent extremism in the study regions. In all twenty-three (23) CSOs and NGOs were mentioned by both primary and secondary respondents.

They are expected to complement the efforts of security services by explaining the security consequences of terrorist attacks and their implications on communities. On this, the study sought to understand the strategies used by CSOs to fight against violent extremism. The following are the strategies they use from the perspectives of key informants

**Community Engagements and Collaboration:** The key informants indicated that CSOs engage community members and leaders by collaborating with key institutions to carry out their education and sensitization programmes in communities. The following were mentioned by some key informants;

*“As I said, we do a lot of community engagements, we have various groups that have been created within the communities and we engage them and these groups are made up of community leaders and those who resided in the communities. For example, this week, World Vision is sponsoring us including NCCE we are going around over all the communities”. (KI, CSO, OTI Region)*

*“We work with a number of institutions to ensure that conflict and threats of violent extremism are eliminated. Although our office is here, we have other offices in the Upper East and Northern Regions of the country. We collaborate with the police in carrying out our work” (CSO, Bono East Region)*

The highlights of the contributions of both state and non-state actors in the fight against violent extremism in Ghana is captured in Box 6.3

### 6.3.3 Availability Focal Persons Spearheading Activities Related to Violent Extremism

The study explored the presence of focal persons at both state and non-state institutions to spearhead activities that are related to the fight against violent extremism.



Among all five (5) security agencies visited across the study regions there was no mention of focal persons for addressing violent extremism. . However, institutional structures and units exists to deal with issues related to violent extremism and terrorism. Key informants expressed the following;

*“We don’t have a focal person who is in charge of violent extremist-related issues instead we work together as a team to get the job done”. (KI, Security Agency, Savannah)*

*“As I said earlier, the entire institution of the Ghana Police Service has the mandate of fighting crime. But we do have desks or units for special cases like domestic violence, gender violence etc. What, we have is a counter-terrorist unit within the Police Service whose duty is to investigate and lead intelligence on terrorist activities. They also design strategies to combat extremist activities”. (KI, Security Agency Upper West Region)*

Similarly, from the perspective of the media, there existed no focal persons spearheading activities of violent extremism. This was mentioned by some key informants as;

*“No, there isn’t any focal person assigned to spearhead activities related to violent extremism”. (KI, Media, Bono Region)*

*“Not really, we don’t have, maybe we might have but not officially as a position. Over here, we have teams (Entertainment, Social and Political Presenters) who handle social and political programmes whose duties are to speak about those issues”. (KI, Media, OTI Region)*

**Presence of Focal Persons at Non-State Institutions:** Again, just as the case for state institutions, there exist no focal persons at the non-state institutions to spearhead activities related to violent extremism. However, some civil society organizations and faith-based organizations mentioned the existence of structures to deal with issues related to violent extremism. The voices of some key informants are as follows;

*“The project officer is in charge of spearheading activities related to violent extremism. They get signals from communities and they try to solve them. Last week, two Fulani men were arrested because it was believed that they are either members of extremist groups and therefore needed information or they are armed robbers. This incident happened in Chereponi.” (KI, CSO, North East)*

*“We have units, the Christian Council of Ghana as a whole has a department known as the inter-faith department which I am one of, where we run a project for promoting peace through inter-faith dialogue in Northern Ghana”. (KI, Religious Authority, Northern Ghana).*

## 6.4 Institutional Challenges in fighting the Risk and Threat of Violent Extremism

This section presents the challenges of state and non-state actors in terms of how well they are equipped in the fight against violent extremist activities in Ghana.

### 6.4.1 Challenges of State Actors

Reports from the NAFPVET indicate the existence of structural challenges and institutional bottlenecks in the security agencies of Ghana resulting in some lapses in enforcing anti-terrorism strategies (MNS, 2019). All five (5) security agencies interviewed expressed concerns about some logistical and coordination challenges they are confronted with.

The statements below highlight feedback received on pertinent logistical (communication), administrative - accommodation, and other operational challenges mentioned.

*“We are not equipped. We lack logistics, and accommodation for personnel patrolling at the borders and lastly, most of the communities around the borders don’t have telecommunication networks which makes it difficult for the people to alert them and send signals”. (KI Security Agencies, Upper East Region)*

*“We are not fully equipped in terms of weapons, vehicles and other protective wear gears when violent extremism occurs”(KI, Security Agency, Bono Region)*

*“...we are faced with communication challenges thus communicating from Tsatse to our nearest point at Bole is very difficult. We do not have equipment such as vehicles for our operations. At the Ivory coast border point we rely on Ghana Immigration’s vehicle for our operational activities” (Security Agency, Savannah)*

Some security agencies indicated some challenges they faced in coordinating and collaborating with other institutions and community members in the fight against violent extremism. This was expressed as;

*“Another challenge is the coordination between us and other sister security agencies. Sometimes we relay information to them and it takes a while before they act on them and sometimes too, they don’t even act on them. You see these sometimes make our job a bit difficult you know. Also, the willingness of the citizens to volunteer information to is also a challenge to us”. (KI, Security Agency, OTI Region)*

### 6.4.2 Challenges of Non-State Actors

For non-state actors four (4) Religious and Traditional Authorities mentioned that they are equipped to respond to the risk and threat of violent extremism. This was in the form of training and the existence of established structures to deal with insecurity in the region. Some key informants expressed the following;

*“Yes, because we have gone through training. We have had training and we know the things that we should be looking out for. To be able to say that these*

*are signals that we shouldn't just sweep under the carpet, is something that needs further investigation. And based on that, I believe we are able. Once we are confronted with that, we'll be able to tell whether this is signals of violence and so and so on" (KI, Traditional Authority, Northern Region)*

*"Yes, we do. I am saying this because we have established structures at various levels to help assist as earlier mentioned. Also, in terms of leadership and various professionals, the church has to support". (KI, Religious Authority, Bono Region)*

On the contrary majority of them felt they were constrained financially. They were equally concerned about the inadequacy of operation logistics like vehicles and motorbikes as well as the limited number of staff in some instances.


## 6.5 Community Member's Perspectives on the Contributions of State Actors to Promote Peaceful Coexistence and Fight Violent Extremism

This section presents the views of community members regarding, receipt of information on the subject of violence extremism and their participation in programs organized by some state and non-state institutions on peaceful co-existence in study areas. It also presents an assessment of state and non-state institutions from the perspective of community members in addressing issues related to violent extremism in study areas.

### 6.5.1 Receipt of Education or Information on addressing or preventing violent extremism in district

From figure 6.1, close to half (48 percent) of the primary respondents emphasized that they have received education on addressing and preventing violent extremism in their districts.


**Figure 6.1: Awareness of Education on Addressing or Preventing Violent Extremism**



**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

Radio was cited as the primary source of receipt of information on the subject of violent extremism. This was mentioned by approximately half (49.8%) (of those who had received information on the subject). This was followed by the television and through NCCE's community engagements in that order. The least 0.3 percent mentioned news portal. The other category (3.5 percent) included the church and CSO's as sources of information. This is presented in figure 6.2

**Figure 6.2: Source of Information on Addressing or Preventing Violent Extremism (%)**




**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

### 6.5.2 Participation in Forums on Preventing Violent Extremism by State Institutions

Figure 6.1 presents community members view on whether they have attended a forum or engagements on preventing violent extremism organized by any government entity in their districts. On this, about one-fifth indicated that they have attended a forum on violent extremism. The majority (78.6 percent) on the other hand indicated otherwise.

**Figure 6.3: Participation in Forums on Preventing Violent Extremism by State Institutions (%)**



**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

Of the 289 (21.4 percent) persons who mentioned that they had attended a forum on violent extremism, 79.2 percent indicated that the program was organized by the NCCE in their districts. Another 12.5 percent mentioned that the forum was organized by the District Assembly in their districts. The distribution is captured in Table 6.

**Table 6.1: Participation in Forums on Preventing Violent Extremism organized by State Institutions**

State Institutions	Frequency	Percent
NCCE	229	79.2
District/Municipal/Metropolitan Assembly	36	12.5
Ghana Police Service	7	2.4
Ministry of Local government and rural development	4	1.4
Ministry of Information	3	1
Information Service Department	3	1
Can't remember	3	1
Other	4	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>100.0</b>


**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

### 6.5.3 Effectiveness of State Institutions in Districts in Addressing Violent Extremism

Generally, on the effectiveness of districts in addressing violent acts, more than half of the community members from the Bono Region (51.2 percent), Bono East Region (54.0 percent), Northern Region (52.5 percent), Upper East Region (50.2 percent) and Upper West Region (66.5 percent) indicated that their districts have been somewhat effective in addressing violent acts. Another 47.1 percent from Oti Region indicated that their districts have been somewhat effective in addressing violent acts.

On the contrary, North East (57.8 percent) and Savannah (41.4 percent) indicated that their districts have been not at all effective in addressing violent acts. This is presented in Figure 6.2

**Figure 6.4: Effectiveness of Districts in Addressing Violent Extremism**




Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023

#### 6.5.4 Community Awareness of measures by Government to Prevent Violent Extremism in Ghana

From Figure 6.5, about a quarter (27.5 percent) of communities mentioned that they are aware of measures put in place by the government to prevent violent extremism in their districts.

**Figure 6.5: Awareness of measures by the Government to prevent violent extremism in Ghana**



Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023

Of those who mentioned that they are aware of measures put in place by the government to prevent violent extremism in their districts, 36.1 percent indicated that they have heard of the ‘See Something, Say Something’ initiative by the government. Another 25 percent indicated that they are aware of constant patrol by security personnel at the borders of their regions. The measures are highlighted in Table 6.2

**Table 6.2 Measures by Government to Prevent Violent Extremism**

Measures by Government to Prevent Violent Extremism	Frequency	Percent
The government’s “See something, say something” initiative creates awareness of violent extremist activities.	134	36.1
There has been constant patrol of security personnel at our borders.	93	25
The establishment of a military base in the various regions	28	7.5
There has been continuous sensitization by NCCE in the district on the need to be vigilant	24	6.5
Government has recruited more security personnel, almost every village has a police security post	19	5.1
The government has resourced the security agencies	15	4
The establishment of DISEC in the regions	14	3.8
Government is supporting institutions like NCCE to educate the general public on the effects of violent extremism groups	12	3.2
Government has organized and deployed security personnel to the various districts	9	2.4
There has been education on the importance of peaceful co-existence in the region.	7	1.9
Don’t remember	4	1.1
Other	13	3.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

### 6.5.6 Institutions/Persons to Report Suspicious Acts of Violence to in Districts

Community members were asked about who to report any suspicious activities to in the districts. On this 45 percent of the community members indicated that they will report to security agencies. The next 23.1% indicated that they will report to Assemblyman/woman and the least indicated that they will call 999 for help. This is presented in Table 6.3

**Table 6.3: Institutions/Persons to Report Suspicious Violent Activities in District**


Institution/Person	Frequency	Percent
Security Service (Police, Immigration, Army)	608	45.0
Assemblyman/woman	312	23.1
Chief	164	12.1
Family elder	121	9.0
Friend/family member	60	4.4
Land lord	58	4.3
Religious leader	11	0.8
Call the 999 help line	8	0.6
Other	9	0.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>1351</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

### 6.6 Community Members Feedback on the Contributions of Non-state actors on promoting peaceful coexistence fighting against Violent Extremism

The study found that approximately one out of every ten primary study respondents had attended a program on peace-building by an NGO or CSO in their respective districts. This is presented in Figure 6.6

**Figure 6.6: Participation in Forums on Preventing Violent Extremism by Non-State Institutions**



*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

A number of non-state institutions were mentioned by community members to be involved in activities related to violent extremism in the study regions. These institutions included the World Vision, Action Aid Ghana, and the Christian Council among others as depicted in Table 6.5



**Table 6.4: Non-State Institutions that Engage in Activities Related to Violent Extremism**

Institution	Frequency	Percent
NCCE	55	40.4
World Vision Ghana	16	11.8
Action Aid Ghana	5	3.7
Christian Council	5	3.7
Camfed	4	2.9
NORSAAC	4	2.9
Star Ghana	3	2.2
Nanung peace initiative	3	2.2
RAINS GHANA	3	2.2
Songtaba	3	2.2
Dagbang forum	2	1.5
USAID	2	1.5
SEND Ghana	2	1.5
Other	13	9.6
Don't remember the name	16	11.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

## 6.7 Ways to Prevent Violence and Violent Extremism in Study Areas

The study explored from key informants the best ways to prevent violent extremism in Ghana. From their perspectives, the best ways include education and sensitization, employment creation, strengthening border security, resourcing institutions, eliminating political vigilantism, enhancing community and security vigilance and tolerating community members irrespective of ethnic, religious and political affiliation. Some quotations on these suggestions are presented as follows

### Education and Sensitization:

*“I think that we can create awareness about what is happening around us so let us hold on to our peace and not give chance to tribal factions like what is happening in Bawku will not happen to us as a country. When you see strangers coming and you don't know what they are here for, you could alert the authorities so that they can come and find out what they are here for, you should alert the authorities so that they can come, they will come and survey the place to know what is happening before they come, they will come and survey the place to know what is happening before they come in”. (KI, Traditional Authority, North East)*

*“Education is key, through sensitization, the people need to be engaged constantly. For instance, the president of the house has informed them to use that platforms on Mondays and Fridays to always remind the people what is at stake and that they shouldn’t take things for granted. So constant education, sensitization, creating awareness that our neighbours are witnessing those crimes and if we don’t take care we will also receive our share.” (Security Agencies, Northern Region).*

### **Provision of Employment Opportunities:**

*“Youth unemployment should be looked at because most of the unemployed youth who have completed either vocational or skill training or even school and are sitting down without jobs are open to anything and they can do anything because they are looking for a livelihood so anybody can use anything to convince them to do anything. So, youth unemployment should be looked at”. (KI, CSO, Northern Region)*

*“We have to look at the root cause so that we can tackle the root cause. High rate of unemployment in the system. There is the likelihood that most of the youth can be lured to join these groups. Good governance and making the youth employable can help prevent violent extremism”.(KI, Security Agency, Savannah Region)*

*“Unemployment must be addressed because we have a larger population of youth who are not working”. (KI, Security Agency, Savannah Region)*

### **Strengthening Border Security:**

*“We should be able to motivate staff who work around the border by paying them on time, providing more weapons for them, they should be given fuel regularly so they can be able to patrol around and even the vehicles they would use. We should improve upon our border infrastructure that is our personnel, logistics and network of informants. The roads to the borders should also be developed. Institutions like the National Intelligence Bureau and the Ghana Immigration Service should also be supplied with drones to pick up signals promptly. Lastly, there should be application of technology in our institutions. In intelligence gathering, the use of technology is needed for utmost seriousness. We should be able to rely more on technology than humans”. (KI, Security Agency, Upper East)*

*“...so, I think that if we really want to protect ourselves, we should invest more in equipping our security. like the security agencies, I just mentioned the Police and Immigration in the whole district, they have only one vehicle and I see them with two motorbikes, They should be equipped with more motorbikes, ten or fifteen so that they can be everywhere within the district because this is a border region. There is Immigration Service here I wish I can provide them with more motorbikes so that they can patrol all the time”. (KI,CSO, Oti Region)*

## Financing and Building Capacities of Institutions:

*“We need to equip our institutions that are advocating for cohesion and peaceful coexistence. NCCE is one of them that should be resourced. The chiefs should be resourced with training opportunities to know which issues to handle and what other professional institutions are to handle as well. Educational activities must be increased to cover a wider area”. (KI, Traditional Authority, Savannah Region)*

**Enhancing Community and Security Vigilance:** Key informants mentioned the need for security agencies to be vigilant to pick early warning signs of violent extremism while community members should endeavour to report any strange events or activity that is happening in their vicinities.

*“The security agencies should be vigilant always on the lookout for strange or suspicious persons or groups. Secondly, the citizens should be whistle-blowers. When they hear or see something happening, they should alert the authorities so they can also investigate. Community members must say something if you see something suspicious going on if you don’t, we will all face the consequences together”. (KI, Religious Institution, Bono)*

*“Government must also intensify this campaign of “See something, Say something”. (KI, Security Agency, Oti Region)*

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### GENDER DYNAMICS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE IN THE PROJECT REGIONS OF GHANA

#### 7.1 Introduction

Gender and violent extremism are closely and intricately related. (Idris, 2019) . One's gender may influence their increased participation in acts of violence or membership in violent extremist groups. On the other hand, the severity of the impact of violent extremist activities on individuals tends to differ based on their gender. This is because gender tends to mirror one's vulnerability to an act of violence or otherwise. Thus, an individual may be a conduit for ease of recruitment due to their vulnerability based on their gender or they could be coerced to join violent extremist groups and participate in violent acts based on their gender. Additionally, men and women may have different motives to join or support extremist groups and also based on the gendered roles, they may participate in different ways in violent activities. In this regard, the study explored the gendered nuances of violent extremism in the project districts and regions. Additionally, the NCCE's 2021 Gender Policy document, requires that research conducted by the Commission incorporates gender dynamics and dimensions into the subject matter. This chapter, thus, presents a detailed and comprehensive discourse on gender dynamics and violent extremism activities in the eight regions in the northern part of Ghana.

#### 7.2 The role of women in supporting violence and violent extremism

The perpetration of violent extremism activities is gendered and varies between men and women, children, as well as other social groups. Table 7.1 presents results on the gender distribution of participants by those who have ever or never engaged in any form of violent acts. The study found that 3.4 percent of the primary respondents had ever engaged or participated in any form of violent acts. Out of this figure, 30.4 percent were women. Generally, these women had engaged in acts of violence associated with land, election and chieftaincy disputes.

**Table 7.1 Participants' Participation and Non-participation in Acts of Violence by Gender**

Gender	Have you ever engaged in any form of violent act?	
	Yes	No
Male	32 (69.6%)	64 (49.4%)
Female	14 (30.4%)	660 (50.6%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>46 (3.4%)</b>	<b>1305 (96.6%)</b>

*Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023*

Findings from the key informants' interviews (secondary participants), on the other hand, offered varied perspectives on women's role in violent extremist activities. Notable among these include;

**Women as Conduit for the Supply of Weapons:** The key informants indicated that women form part of the supply chain of weapons for extremist activities. A key informant in the North East region highlighted:

*“When the extremists are able to work through women it makes it easier because people, in general, think they are vulnerable and are not likely to engage in these violent extremist acts. They can carry bombs in their firewood and will not be searched by any security personnel. Women can pretend to be pregnant but will be carrying weapons on them” - (KI, CSO, North East).*

Generally, women are often used as conduits for the transportation and supply of weapons for nefarious activities by extremist groups. This is because they are generally considered the weaker sex and vulnerable. They are therefore likely to escape from being searched or screened by security operatives during wars and conflicts. This was equally affirmed by the security agencies in the study regions.

*“Women can also be a conduit through which weapons can be transported from one location to the other - (KI, Security Agency, Bono East Region).*

*Women can be perpetrators of violent extremist acts. They can play the role of suicide bombers. This has happened before and could happen again. When they are carrying their goods and firewood you might not know if bombs are inside. They can even hide them in their clothes” - (KI, Security Agency, Upper East region).*

**Source of information:** Most key informants believed that extremist groups usually used women as their source of information to guide their operational activities. The extremist groups recruit women to act as spies and they feed them with relevant information to aid their operations. A senior officer interviewed in the Upper West region presented that:

*“When they are on the opposite side they can be very dangerous. Women are very unsuspecting so they can play spy roles very cleverly and well. You manage to arrest women and the international community says you are maltreating them so sanctions must be imposed (KI, Security Agency Upper West, Region).*

**Moral Support:** For some key informants, women as wives, mothers and caregivers can encourage their husbands and children to join extremist groups to acquire money. They also advise their spouses and children to engage or participate in violent extremist activities and other forms of violence for money and other material gains. The views of two senior security officers are presented as follows:

*So, women can perpetrate violent extremist acts by giving advice to their spouses or children to misbehave or engaging in acts of violent extremism because of greed or love for money – (KI, Security Agencies, Bono East Region).*

*Women are carriers of information and when they buy into the activities of the extremist, they can influence their male children who are of age and their husbands to join the extremist groups. (Security Agency, Savannah Region).*

**Logistical Support:** In terms of logistical support, women were seen as agents who provide emergency support services and care to men during conflicts and wars. They also provide food, water and shelter for the men, particularly extremist groups. Some key informants expressed this as follows:

*Of course, women can also play a role in these activities, when they send the women you would not suspect them, they also cook and feed these extremists to give them that edge to carry out their activities - (Security Agencies, Oti Region).*

*Women can play several roles, they play a supporting role, for instance, they can conceal and carry arms for the men. They can provide food, water and even shelter for the men - (CSO, Northern Region).*

### 7.3 Effect of Violent Extremism on Men, Women, Children and Person's with Disability

This section describes and presents the effects of violent extremism on women, children and persons with disability. Table 7.2 presents the opinion of primary participants on the type of gender which is more likely to be affected by violent extremist activities. For majority (72.6 percent) of the primary participants, females are more likely to be affected by violent extremist activities than males (Table 7.2).

**Table 7.2 Percentage distribution of Type of Gender More Likely to be Affected by Violent Extremism activities**

Type of Gender more likely to suffer from VE activities	Frequency (n)	Percent (%)
Men	370	27.4
Women	981	72.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>1351</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

Similarly, 27/67 of the key informants believed that women and children as well as persons with disabilities were more likely to be affected by violent extremist activities compared to men. This is expressed in the following statements:

*"It's women because they will find it difficult to escape or run because they might be pregnant while others might also be nursing mothers. It can also affect their mental health because they might have been abused - (KI, Religious Authority, Bono Region).*

*Women and children, physically women are not that tough so sometimes the psychological effect alone knocks them off and they won't be able to recover - (KI, Traditional Authority, Northern Region).*

*Our women, children, and persons with disability are mostly victims of violent extremist acts - (KI, CSO, Bono Region).*

### 7.3.1 Reason Why Women, Children and Persons with Disability are more likely to be affected by Violent Extremist Activities

The study participants were asked to indicate which gender, in their opinion, was more likely to be affected by violent extremist activities. They were further asked to provide reasons for their choice of any particular gender. As indicated in Table 7.2, majority (72.6 percent) indicated that the female gender was more likely to be affected by violent extremist activities. Table 7.3 shows the distribution of the participants by the reasons they gave in support of their responses. For many, women are the most vulnerable group in society, and hence, were more likely to be affected by violent extremist activities. One-third of the participants (27.5%) opined that women are not strong enough to fight during violent extremist activities, and hence, would be worsely affected by such activities. A small proportion of the participants believed that women lacked knowledge and access to weapons and are more likely to be affected by violent extremism activities.

**Table 7.3: Reason why women are more likely to be affected by violent extremism activities**

Reason Why Women are more likely to be affected by VE Activities	Frequency	Percent
Women are the most vulnerable group in society	316	32.2
Women are not strong enough to fight during such activities	270	27.5
Women are poor and overburdened with responsibilities	94	9.6
Women become single parents during wars and violent extremist activities	58	5.9
Women are more attached to their families and therefore cannot run away	141	14.4
Women are mostly guarded by their husbands so when the men are killed they are left helpless	14	1.4
Women are lured, kidnapped, raped, and killed easily during such activities	36	3.7
Women lack the capacity to withstand violent acts	12	1.2
Women lack knowledge and access to weapons	11	1.1
Women are denied their economic livelihood	12	1.2
Don't know	17	1.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>981</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**



From the perspective of the study's key informants showed that women were more probable to suffer from violent extremism activities. These secondary participants mentioned that women particularly pregnant and nursing mothers, persons with disability, and older persons may find it difficult to escape during attacks due to their vulnerability. They also mentioned that women may face more burden from violent extremism activities because they usually provide care for men who suffer injuries and disabilities from wars. Additionally, the informants added that more women usually suffer from sexual abuse during wars and violent attacks. Hence, they could be affected more by violent extremism activities. Corroborating findings from the survey data, the following voices depict the views expressed by some key informants:

*"It's women because they will find it difficult to escape or run because they might be pregnant while others might also be nursing mothers. It can also affect their mental health because they might have been abused"- (KI, Religious Authority, Bono Region).*

*"I think it is women. Women in the sense that, women are psychologically not even fit when it comes to violence, not even in our homes or outside. And in every race, every culture and every religion know that women are weaker side and when there is violence, they cannot withstand it" - (KI, Media, Oti Region).*

*I will say it is the women, I said women because a lot of responsibilities are on them, they care for the adult, they care for the children and even sometimes when the men go to war and they're injured they are the ones that end up taking care of them, so I will say it is the women" - (KI, CSO, Oti Region).*

*"I would say women because of the psychological death of the violation and the impact can be high for women than men. Not only have you lost everything, but your very person is also violated and that can have deep wounds in the person. So obviously, especially when sexual violence is involved, I would say the women - (KI CSO, Northern Region).*

**Children:** On the effects of violent extremism on children, the key informants mentioned that children and women were among the vulnerable population in society, and hence, could be affected more. One key informant said:

*"The children and women are the most vulnerable so their livelihood of course will be affected. If they get to lose their husbands too, the poverty level will go up. And most of them too, you know it's about war so the women are relegated to the background" - (KI, Security Agencies, Oti Region).*

**Persons with Disability and the Elderly:** According to the key informants, persons with disability and older persons could be affected more by violent extremism since the form the most at-risk groups. Some secondary participants cited:

*The most at risk of being victims are women, children, persons with disability, and the elderly - (KI, Security Agencies, Bono Region).*

*Persons with disability, women and children, older people are most at risk of being victims to violent extremist acts - (KI, CSO, Northern Region).*



### 7.3.2 Reason Why Men are More likely to be affected by Violent Extremist Activities

Table 7.4 reports the distribution of the participants by the reasons cited as to why men were more likely to be affected by violent extremist activities compared to other sub-population groups. Of the 370 participants who said men were more likely to suffer from violent extremist activities, the highest proportion (33.5 percent) mentioned that men are usually forced to fight because they are assumed to be strong and courageous. The second most mentioned reason was that men are mostly targeted to engage in violent attacks. The least proportion (0.8 percent) of the participants mentioned that men resort to taking hard drugs because of the psychological trauma they experience during attacks by violent extremists.

**Table 7.4: Reason Why men are more likely to be affected by violent extremism activities**

Reason Why Men are more likely to be affected by VE Activities	Frequency	Percent
Men are most likely to be affected because they are killed during war and any other attacks	55	14.9
They are vulnerable to robbery, kidnapping and violent attacks	34	9.2
Men face extreme poverty during violent attacks because they have to struggle to provide for their families	55	14.9
Men are forced to fight because they are assumed to be strong and courageous	124	33.5
Men are mostly targeted to engage in violent attacks	62	16.8
Men become unemployed and are unable to cater for their families	13	3.5
Men end up losing their properties	5	1.4
Men resort to taking hard drugs because of the psychological trauma they experience	3	0.8
Men lose their dignity during violent attacks	6	1.6
Other	8	2.2
Don't know	5	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023**

Substantiating findings from the survey, key informants mentioned that men were more likely to suffer from violent extremist activities because violent extremists usually target men. The attack on men could lead to many of them fleeing for their lives. Thus, men are also likely to be affected during attacks by violent extremists. These secondary participants said:

*When there is violence, most of the time the men are the ones that are attacked. Sometimes the men have to flee for their lives. If arguments are happening, the majority that will engage in them are men - (KI, CSO, Oti Region).*

*It reduces the population of men. This is because men are often recruited to join these violent extremist groups which could lead to their death - (KI Security Agency, Upper West Region).*

## 7.4 Effects of Conflict on Men and Women

Again, just as in the case of violent extremism, men and women could be impacted by conflict in different ways. For instance, during conflicts, more men may usually be at the war front fighting opponents to preserve their authority or whatever might have resulted or ignited the conflict and hence may be impacted more than their women counterparts. On the other hand, women as mothers, wives, caregivers, partners and sisters, often bear the brunt of conflicts as they have to nurse and care for wounded male warriors. Additionally, they may potentially lose their husbands to conflicts and become widows and eventually take over as breadwinners fending for their families. Thus, this study sought to understand the effects of conflicts on both men and women from the perspectives of key informants.

**Effects of Conflict on men:** Generally, the key informants reported that during conflicts more men die or are killed by opponents. Also, they mentioned that men are usually forcefully recruited by rebel groups during conflicts and they often lose their economic power and assets due to the conflict. The following voices are some perspectives from some of the key informants.

*“Men die during conflicts because they are at the forefront to defend their communities - (KI, Security Agency”, Savannah Region).*

*“Some men also lose economic power because they lose their lands, farms etc” - (KI CSO, Upper East Region).*

*“Men are deployed into rebel or terrorist groups against their wishes, and those who resist these forced enlistments are killed” - (KI, Security Agency, Upper West Region).*

**Effects of Conflict on women:** Key informants asserted that conflicts give women psychological problems. Also, conflict leads to women becoming widows and single parents. Other effects of conflict on women mentioned included sexual abuse, loss of property, displacement, disruption of economic livelihood, hunger, and poverty. Some key informants made these assertions:

*“There are also psychological effects of conflicts. We have evidence to show that in some places, women were sexually abused due to conflicts. For example, houses are burnt in an area and you move to a different community and you are being hosted. After a while, the man of that household begins to harass the woman sexually. Some of them are traumatized and even have mental disorders” - (KI, CSO, Upper East).*

*“Women end up becoming single mothers and they lose their source of economic power because when the husband is around, he helps with taking care of the family but if he is not around, the woman has to take up all the economic burdens. Their voices are reduced and limited because of conflicts” - (KI, CSO, Upper East).*

*“When there is conflict and a curfew is imposed, men and women cannot go out there to work for economic gains. Their livelihood may be affected greatly. Development may be delayed due to conflict” - (KI, Traditional Authority, Savannah)*

*“In fact, it leads to poverty in general. If there is conflict, the man or woman cannot go out to work and it will lead to poverty”- (KI, Media, Savannah).*

## 7.5 The role of women in preventing Violent Extremism

This section discusses key informants’ views on specific support and roles that women could play or provide to prevent violent extremism in their region or community. Key informants cited roles such as acting as agents of peace and serving as positive role models to their spouses and children who may intend to engage in acts of violence. Further, these secondary participants also mentioned education, mediation, tolerance and patience and actions such as marching barefooted for peace as well as avoiding the act of chasing rich men for money as some ways in which women can play to help prevent violent extremism.

**Agents of Peace:** In terms of agents of peace; women can serve as mediators to feuding factions and provide counselling that can lead to peace between these factions. The following are a few quotations from some informants:

*“Women are good peacemakers. They bring about peace quickly if they put their abilities into place, by advising, counselling and being mediators because their presence alone can make a difference” - (KI, Religious Authority, Bono Region).*

*When a woman marries another culture and there are conflicts between the two cultures they serve as brokers of peace. They can play the mediation role”- (CSO, Upper East region).*

**Educational support:** Key informants said that women can provide education to their spouses and children on the negative effects of violent extremist activities and the importance of preventing such activities. They also stated that women can advise their spouses and children to desist from participating in acts of violence. Some of the responses are presented below:

*“Women can help prevent violent extremism through education and taking part in advocating for peace and convincing their husbands to go in for peace”- (KI, Religious Authority, North East Region).*

*“By advising their spouses and children to desist from engaging in such acts, by telling them about the effects it will bring to the country and themselves as humans. You know (laughs) many men listen to the advice of their wives. Also, women can instil the fear of God into their children”- (KI, Media Bono East Region).*

In the Upper East region, a key informant mentioned the role played by women to ensure the end of a year-long protracted ethnic conflict between the Doba and Kandiga people in the Kasena-Nankani East Municipality. He revealed that women's voices are powerful and they are able to influence men to withdraw from the war front or from violent extremist groups. He also declared some actions undertaken by women toward resolving the Doba-Kandiga conflict including marching barefooted to the chief palaces to present their displeasure about the conflict. He averred:

*"Oh, women are doing a great job! Some women can speak to their men to take themselves out of such violent groups and also not to involve themselves in fights. They can advise their men to withdraw from such things. The women who are taking care of our children can speak to the larger male groups because I remember in the Doba situation, the women marched to the palace on barefoot and submitted their concerns. This can help us in maintaining peace - (KI, Traditional Authority, Upper East region).*

**Positive Role Models:** Some (21/67) of the key informants said that women as wives can advise to discourage their spouses and children from joining extremist groups. They can also orient their children right from birth to desist from engaging or participating in acts of violence for money and other material gains.

*"Women have to start the education from the basic level, they have to educate their children and their husbands talking about tolerance and patience. If people are tolerant there is not going to be conflicts. Women must take lead in educating their family members, especially the male youth and their husbands" - (KI, Security agency, North East Region).*

*They can start with educating the children, inculcating in them good habits and then advocacy role, advising the youth, talking to them especially the females to avoid chasing people who are seen as rich. For all you know, they can lure them into these activities and help them perpetuate acts of violent activities - (KI, Security Agency, Oti region).*

In the Northern region, a key informant emphasized the positive role of women in preventing violent extremism in the following statement:

*"There is a saying that a woman is the first teacher of the children. So, when women teach their children and the people that live with them about the need for peaceful co-existence, they will listen" (Religious Institution, Northern Region).*

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 8.1 Introduction

The study on preventing and containing violent extremism in eight regions in the Northern part of Ghana is a baseline study conducted by the NCCE. The study was conducted in March 2023 with the overall goal of understanding the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of communities and at-risk groups to violent extremism and other forms of violence in the study areas. The role and contribution of state and non-state institutions in fighting the menace were also investigated. The study regions were the Northern, North East, Upper East, Upper West, Savannah, Oti, Bono, Bono East and regions.

A cross-sectional mixed-method study design was employed using both quantitative and qualitative techniques. In selecting the respondents, purposive and simple random sampling techniques were employed. The study interviewed one thousand, three hundred and fifty-one (1,351) primary-level study participants for the quantitative study in fifty-nine (59) districts across the eight (8) project regions. Additionally, a total of sixty-seven (67) key informant interviews were also conducted with senior-level officers of selected state and non-state institutions. Data collection was undertaken by trained officers from the district offices and the headquarters of NCCE.

The findings from this study provide useful information to guide policy direction, and inform the content of education and strategies NCCE can adopt through public education to prevent violent extremist activities in Ghana. This final chapter highlights the major findings and makes recommendations for future programmes, policy directions and how NCCE can collaborate with communities/local partners and other agencies to prevent or contain violent extremism in Ghana.

#### 8.2 Summary of Findings

##### 8.2.1 Background Characteristics of Respondents

The proportion of male to female respondents was higher by a slight margin. (50.1% males). Close to thirty percent of the respondents (28.0%) belonged to the 20-29 age category with a similar proportion (28.7%) with no education. Approximately one-third (31.8%) of the primary study respondents were self-employed with majority married (63.1%) and belonging to the Islam religion (53.4%). A little over a third (32.6%) of the respondents were from the Northern region. The study participants for the qualitative study were sixty-seven (67) and all of them were males.

### 8.2.2 Knowledge, Attitudes and Behaviours of Communities and at-risk groups to VE and other Forms of Violence

The study explored the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of communities and at-risk groups regarding violent extremism and other forms of violence in the eight project regions. The study utilized four scenarios (three incorrect and one correct) to assess primary respondents' knowledge of the concept of violent extremism. Generally, the study found that more than six out of ten people in the study regions knew the term violent extremism. Two-thirds (67.0%) of the primary respondents were able to affirm the correct scenario of what constitutes violent extremism. Similarly, knowledge of the concept of violent extremism among the key informants interviewed was almost universal. The youthful age group 15-35 years had the lowest proportion (65.8%) of respondents who were able to affirm the correct statement compared to the other age categories.

Regionally, the Savannah, Oti and Upper East regions in that order recorded a higher proportion of the respondent who knew the concept of violent extremism. On the other hand, regions with the least proportions of respondents who knew the concept of violent extremism included the Northern and Bono East regions.

On knowledge of the existence of extremist groups, 12.0% of the primary respondent knew about these groups. It was observed that a higher proportion of the female respondents had knowledge about persons recruited into violent extremist groups compared to males.

With regards to how people are recruited by violent extremists, it was reported that such groups usually lure victims with money, employment opportunities, expensive gifts (cars, phones) and education opportunities abroad. Politicians were identified by high proportions of the respondent to be the most likely to sponsor and support extremist groups.

Generally, the study primary participants demonstrated a positive attitude in the fight against violent extremism. More than seven out of every ten (77.1%) people said they will advise family members or close friends to desist from joining extremist groups. A relatively small number (11 respondents) were however ready to encourage their friends or family members to engage in violent extremist activities. On witnessing violence and other forms of violence, almost 21 percent of the study respondents have ever witnessed the existence of other forms of violence apart from violent extremism in the study districts.

### 8.2.3 Communities' Level of Tolerance towards People of different backgrounds

The study examined communities' level of tolerance towards different groups in Ghana with particular emphasis on discrimination against or unfair treatment of persons with different ethnic, religious, gender and political backgrounds. Additionally, the study investigated the level of existence of political polarization, religious intolerance, ethnic conflict and chieftaincy factions in Ghana.

Generally, it was observed that communities had a strong level of tolerance toward people of varied backgrounds and beliefs. High proportions of the primary respondents indicated a strong willingness to coexist and interact with people from different backgrounds and political affiliations. Regionally, a higher proportion of the respondents who indicated their willingness to coexist and interact with people from different backgrounds were from the North East



region while the least was from Oti region. Conversely, a cluster of violent conflicts were reported to be existing among some communities in the study regions. Notable among them were ethnic conflicts, chieftaincy factions and land/boundary disputes. The study noted that ethnic conflicts and chieftaincy disputes were mostly occurring in the Northern, North East and Upper East regions. KIs confirmed the existence of violent conflicts in districts such as Kassena-Nankana West, Savelugu, Chereponi, Bunkpurugu and Nankpanduri.

With regard to discrimination, the study assessed the prevalence of discrimination on three main thematic areas; denial of access to a public facility, unfair treatment of persons in the community and harassment. Generally, there was positive feedback regarding acts of discrimination against persons based on their gender, background, political affiliation and belief system. Only a few proportions of the respondent had witnessed some acts of discrimination against people based on their gender, ethnicity and political affiliations. Of this figure, the highest proportion (23.0%) of had witnessed discrimination against and harassment of persons with disability. It was observed that persons with disability were mostly denied access to some public facilities due to lack of disability-friendly facilities in those public places.

#### **8.2.4 Contribution of State and Non-state actors in the fight against violent extremism**

The contribution of state and non-state actors toward the fight against violent extremism was assessed by the study. Generally, the study found that state actors including security agencies were involved in intelligence gathering, collaborating with institutions and having structures in place to prevent and contain violent extremism. The media, on the other hand, engages in education and sensitization programmes to create awareness among the general public against violent extremism. Additionally, the study observed that Civil Society Organizations, religious authorities and traditional authorities mostly engaged community members as well as collaborated with other institutions to educate the public against acts of violence. Finally, the feedback received from the interviews showed that there were no focal persons at the security agencies to spearhead activities related to violent extremism. However, institutional structures and units such as the counter terrorism unit exist in institutions such as the BNI, Ghana Immigration Service and the Ghana Armed Forces to deal with issues related to violent extremism and terrorism.

With regard to the challenges faced by state and non-state institutions in their response to the risk and threat of violent extremism, the study found that state institutions particularly security agencies are often bedeviled with logistical and technical challenges. Similarly, non-state institutions were under-resourced to be able to provide the right architecture necessary for the fight against violent extremism.

On ways to prevent violence and violent extremism, the study found that education and sensitization programs were critical to creating awareness among community members on the happenings of violent extremism in neighbouring countries to detect signs of extremist activities in communities. Additionally, it was observed that eschewing tribal politics, political vigilantism and discrimination among political parties is paramount to preventing violent extremism. Furthermore, there is a need for the government to adequately resource state institutions, particularly security agencies to fight against violent extremism. Again, the issue of unemployment featured prominently among other drivers of radicalization into violent extremist activities.

### 8.2.5 Gender Dynamics of Violent extremism and other Forms of Violence in Ghana

The study explored the role of gender in violent extremism. Specifically, it assessed the role of women as perpetrators and agents in preventing violent extremist activities. It also investigated the effect of violent extremism on men and women and other special interest groups. Of the 3.4% of the primary respondents who had ever engaged or participated in any form of violent acts, 30.4% were women. From the perspective of key informants, women as mothers, caregivers and wives often serve as a conduit for the supply of weapons and source of information for violent extremists. Additionally, it was observed that women often provide moral and logistical support to violent extremist groups.

With regards to the type of gender that would be more affected by violent extremism activities, majority (72.6%) of the respondents indicated that the female gender was more likely to be affected. Similarly, almost half of the key informants believed that women and children as well as persons with disabilities were more likely to be affected by violent extremist activities compared to men. It was further observed that women particularly pregnant and nursing mothers, persons with disability and the elderly will be heavily affected by extremist attacks as they may find it difficult to escape during attacks. Close to 3 out of every 10 people (27.5%) opined that women are not strong enough to fight during violent extremist activities and hence would be more affected by such activities. Other opinions emerged that men were more likely to suffer from violent extremist activities because they are usually forced to fight on the assumption of being strong and courageous.

On the effects of conflict on men and women, the case was not different from the opinions shared on the effects of violent extremism on the different genders. Again, from the perspectives of key informants, women as mothers, wives, caregivers, partners and sisters, often bear the brunt of conflicts as they have to nurse and care for wounded male warriors.

With respect to the support and roles that women play or provide to prevent violent extremism, Key informants mentioned that women often act as agents of peace, provide education and serve as positive role models to their spouses and children. Other attributes mentioned included mediation, tolerance, patience and taking actions such as marching barefooted for peace as it happened in the Upper East region some ways in which women can employ to help prevent violent extremism and other forms of acts of violence.

## 8.3 Conclusion

From the study findings, the issue of violence and violent extremism are still a threat in Ghana, despite the fact that generally, there is peaceful coexistence between people from different socio-political backgrounds. Community and institutional gaps exist in terms of knowledge on the subject and resources required for the fight against the menace. The need for a more concerted effort by state and non-state actors in the fight against violent extremism and the building of resilience among community members becomes critical. The intensification of public education on the subject and the fortification of institutions in terms of resources such as modern technology for intelligence gathering particularly for border security are necessary to augment existing structures. Again, gender dynamics on the issue of violent extremism must be considered in programmes and activities related to the fight against violent extremism.



These pointers are crucial for policy direction and decision-making in Ghana and for shaping public discourse on violent extremism and other forms of violence.

## 8.4 Recommendation

Based on the findings of the study, the following are suggested.

1. The study found that eleven respondents were willing to encourage their family members or close friends to join an extremist group. Even though the number is relatively low, this is a worrying situation as six of them were in the youth category. The study recommends intensive and targeted education for the youth in particular to prevent them from being radicalized or influencing others to join extremist groups.
2. It was observed that a higher proportion of the female respondents had knowledge about persons recruited into violent extremist groups compared to males. Additionally, the study found that women could play a critical role in the perpetration of acts of violence. Therefore, strategies that are designed to prevent and contain violent extremism should incorporate gender equality tools to ensure women's inclusion and participation.
3. There is the need to seriously tackle Chieftaincy disputes and other forms of conflict and violence acts that are dotted across the study regions which have the potential to breed violent extremist activities. It is recommended that local and national actors such as the traditional councils, regional house of chiefs, regional office of the National Peace Council, religious leaders, CSOs and Security Agencies must be actively involved in the fight against violent extremism.
4. It was observed that persons with disability were mostly denied access to some public facilities due lack of disability-friendly facilities in those public places. It is therefore recommended that Government enforces the implementation of the disability act (Act 715) which enjoins all public facilities to incorporate disability-friendly facilities into their buildings.
5. The issue of unemployment was observed to be among the key drivers of radicalization into violent extremist activities. This was reiterated by some key informants as part of the root causes of radicalization. It is recommended that, the government and the private sector provide more employment avenues, particularly for the youth who form a bulge of Ghana's population to prevent them from being susceptible to the influence of extremist groups.
6. Towards improving security particularly along Ghana borders by security agencies, it is recommended that modern and innovative technologies such as drones be employed to detect early warning signals and facilitate rapid intelligence gathering.

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## APPENDIX I: STUDY INSTRUMENT

### NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CIVIC EDUCATION

#### QUESTIONNAIRE

#### “BASELINE STUDY ON PREVENTING AND CONTAINING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN EIGHT NORTHER REGIONS OF GHANA.”

The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), as part of its mandate is carrying out baseline research on preventing and containing violent extremism (VE) in eight northern regions of Ghana. The study seeks to assess the knowledge attitudes and behaviors of communities and at-risk groups to violent extremism and other forms of violence in selected regions. The study also examines communities’ levels of tolerance towards different religious and linguistic groups as well as identify and assess the contributions of state and non-state actors in the fight against VE.

**PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT YOUR RESPONSES WILL BE TREATED WITH  
UTMOST CONFIDENTIALITY. CONSEQUENTLY, YOU NEED NOT PROVIDE  
YOUR NAME)**

**NAME OF INTERVIEWER.....**

**REGION.....**

**DISTRICT/MUNICIPAL/METRO. ....**

**LOCALITY NAME. ....**

**DATE OF INTERVIEW.....**

**1. Gender:**

i. Male ..... ☐

ii. Female..... ☐

**Disability Status:**

i. PWD..... ☐

ii. Non- PWD..... ☐

Is the respondent a herdsman?

i. Yes ☐

ii. No ☐

**2. Age: How old are you in complete years?**

..... years

**3. Educational background: (highest attainment)**

i. Never Attended..... ☐

ii. Primary ..... ☐

iii. Quranic school..... ☐

iv. Middle/JSS/JHS..... ☐

v. Secondary/SSS/SHS..... ☐

vi. Commercial/Vocational..... ☐

vii. Post-Secondary (diploma) ..... ☐

viii. Tertiary (Bachelor, Cert. Diploma, masters, Ph.D. etc) ..... ☐

ix. Other (specify) ..... ☐



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#### 4. What is your employment status?

- i. Employed (Public sector) ..... ☐
- ii. Employed (Private sector)..... ☐
- iii. Self-employed without employee(s). ☐
- iv. Self-employed with employee(s)..... ☐
- v. Casual worker..... ☐
- vi. Apprentice..... ☐
- vii. Domestic employee ..... ☐
- viii. Unemployed (looking for a job)..... ☐
- ix. Unemployed (not looking for a job).... ☐

#### 5. Marital status

- i. Single ☐      ii. Separated ☐      iii. Widowed ☐
- iv. Married ☐      v. Divorced ☐      vi. Living together. ☐
- vii. Any Other (specify).....

#### 6. Religious affiliation

- i. No religion..... ☐      ii. Christian ..... ☐
- iii. Islam..... ☐      iv. Traditionalist..... ☐
- v. Any Other (Please specify) .....

#### 7. Ethnicity:

- i. Akan..... ☐      vi. Dagbani..... ☐      xi. Fulani.... ☐
- ii. Ga/Dangme..... ☐      vii. Grusi..... ☐      xii. Gruni..... ☐
- iii. Ewe..... ☐      viii. Kusaal ..... ☐      Konkomba... ☐
- iv. Guan ..... ☐      ix. Mampruli..... ☐      xiii. Bimoba.. ☐
- v. Waala..... ☐      x. Sissala..... ☐      xiv. Dagari... ☐

xv. Other...

**SECTION B: KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR OF  
COMMUNITIES AND AT-RISK GROUPS TOWARDS VIOLENT EXTREMISM  
& OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE**

8. State whether you agree or disagree that the following statements explain violent extremism  
Please indicate if you strongly agree, Agree, Neutral, strongly disagree or disagree.

Statements	Level of Agreement					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Don't know
a. A serious and prolong disagreement among persons or group of persons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. An act of justification, support and use of violent to achieve a goal normally political, social, religious or ideology.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Deceiving others in order to take advantage of them	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Using one's personal resources to fight injustice.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

9. In the past 12 months, have you **heard** about any violent extremist acts in your district?

i. Yes ☐

ii. No ☐

10a. In the past 12 months, have you **witnessed** any violent extremist acts in your district?

i. Yes ☐

ii. No ☐

10b. If yes, how often does this act (act mentioned) occur in your district?

☐

☐

i. Very Often ☐ ii. Sometimes iii. Seldom ☐ iv. Never

11. Have you heard about any violent extremist group in your district?

i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

12. Do you know of any group within your locality or outside your locality which incite or promote;

	Yes	No
Hatred and discrimination against other groups and persons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Violence against other groups or persons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Reward people for perpetuating violence against other groups or persons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

13a. Are you aware of any group or persons recruiting people to perpetuate violence in your locality or district?

i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

13b. If yes to 13a, how do they lure people to recruit (*Select One*)

- i. By sponsoring their education.....☐
- ii. Providing them with money.....☐
- iii. Giving them expensive gifts (cars, houses).....☐
- iv. Promising them of a better live abroad .....☐
- v. By providing social services and infrastructure (boreholes, schools etc)..☐
- vi. Promising employment opportunities .....☐
- vii. Providing assurance of security and protection. ☐
- viii. Other .....☐

13c. If Yes to 13a, in your opinion which category of people do they target the most? (*Select one*)

i. Youth.....☐



- ii. Unemployed youth.....☐
- iii. Women .....☐
- iv. Children .....☐
- v. Opinion leaders.....☐
- vi. Religious leaders.....☐
- vii. Traditional leaders.....☐
- viii. Prison returnees/Ex-convicts .....☐
- ix. Ex-military/police officers.....☐
- x. Ardent Internet users .....☐
- xi. Refugees/Asylum seekers .....☐
- xii. Irregular Migrants .....☐
- xiii. Any other (specify).....

14. Some people help or support the activities of the extremist groups and violence. In your opinion, which institution persons or group of people are likely to support or give assistance to extremist groups?" *(Select one)*

- i. Foreign governments.....☐
- ii. Government representatives.....☐
- iii. Security Personnel.....☐
- iv. Religious leaders.....☐
- v. Foreign nationals.....☐
- vi. Politicians .....☐
- vii. Multinational companies/businesses...☐
- viii. Terrorist organizations.....☐
- ix. Don't know.....☐
- x. Others.....

15. In your opinion what could motivate people to join violent extremist groups? *(select one)*

- i. Political and socioeconomic marginalization.....☐
- ii. Religious suppression.....☐

- iii. Adventure.....☐
- iv. Inequality.....☐
- v. Unemployment.....☐
- vi. Financial gain .....☐
- vii. Alienation.....☐
- viii. Lack of tolerance.....☐
- ix. Injustice.....☐
- x. Lack of voice.....☐
- xi. Bad governance .....☐
- xii. Corruption .....☐
- xiii. Unresolved conflicts .....☐
- xiv. Human right violations by the police/Military.....☐
- xv. Don't know.....
- xvi. Others.....

16. In your opinion, what is the main factor that lead some groups or persons to support violent extremist groups? (*Select One*)

- i. Personal enrichment.....☐
- ii. Government mistreatment or injustices experienced.....☐
- iii. Poor performance of government to meet the needs of people.....☐
- iv. Corruption .....☐
- v. Religious beliefs.....☐
- vi. Coercion/fear of extremist groups.....☐
- vii. Don't know.....☐
- viii. Other .....

16b. Between men and women, which gender is more likely to be affected by violent extremist activities?

i. Men ☐

ii Women ☐

16c. Give one reason for your answer?

.....  
.....

17. In the context of insecurity in Ghana, imagine that you are approached and offered an interesting financial proposal by someone that seems suspicious or is part of a suspicious group in exchange for your help. Please tell me if it is very likely, likely, unlikely or very unlikely that you would personally do the following in this situation:

	Very likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very unlikely
a. Try to avoid contact with that person.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Consult a friend or family member.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Try to learn more about the offer	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Contact the official authorities (e.g., the security forces)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Consult a community leader	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Will access the money and offer the help	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

18. Do you know of any person or individual in your district who has been recruited by an extremist group to perpetuate violence?

i. Yes ☐

ii. No ☐

19. If you happen to know that a family member or close friend is expressing interest in joining an extremist group, what would you do? (*Select One*)

i. Encourage him/her to join .....☐

ii. Advise him/her to desist from joining.....☐

iii. Report him/her to security agency.....☐

iv. Do nothing.....☐

v. Other (Specify) .....

20a. Do you think there will come a time, Ghana will experience an extremist attack?

i. Yes ☐

ii. No ☐

iii. Not sure ☐

20b. If Yes or No, briefly provide reason for your response?

.....

21a. In the past 12 months, have you **witnessed** any violent acts (apart from violent extremism) in your district?

i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

21b. If Yes to 21a, what form of violence was that? (*Select One*)

- i. Chieftaincy dispute.....☐
- ii. Land dispute .....☐
- iii. Ethnic conflict .....☐
- iv. Inter-communal clashes.....☐
- v. Religious conflict.....☐
- vi. Election related violence .....☐
- vii. Armed robbery .....☐
- viii. Any other .....☐

21c. If yes to 21a, how often does this act (act mentioned) occur in your district?

i. Very Often ☐ ii. Sometimes ☐ iii. Seldom ☐ iv. Never ☐

22 a. Have you ever engaged in any form of violent act?

i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

22 b. If Yes, what type/form of violent act did you engage in? (*Select One*)

- i. Election related violence...☐
- ii. Chieftaincy disputes.....☐
- iii. Religious conflicts.....☐
- iv. Armed robbery .....☐
- v. Tribal violence .....☐
- vi. Inter-communal clashes.. ☐
- vii .Land disputes.....☐

viii. Any other (specify).....

22 c. Why did you engage in the violent act(s) mentioned? (*Select One*)

- i. For my voice to be heard .....☐
- ii. For better living condition .....☐
- iii. To demand for my right .....☐
- iv. To put fear in people .....☐
- v. Other .....

### SECTION C: COMMUNITIES LEVEL OF TOLERANCE TOWARDS DIFFERENT GROUPS

23. For each of the following group of persons, please indicate whether you would like to have people from this group as neighbours by ticking one of the likert scale given; would like, wouldn't care, would dislike

Group of persons	Would like	Wouldn't care	Would Dislike	Don't know
a. People of different religion(s)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. People from another ethnic group	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. People belonging to political party other than yours	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

24. How often, if at all have you personally been discriminated against or harassed based on any of the following:

	Once	Several times	Never	Not Applicable
Your ethnicity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Your religion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Your political affiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Disability status	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
--------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

25. How would you rate the level of existence of the following in your community:

	Does not exist	Exist but not violent	Exist with violence
a. Political polarization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Religious intolerance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Ethnic conflict	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Chieftaincy factions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Land/Boundary disputes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

26. In your district, have you ever witnessed a situation where someone was denied access to public facility (*place of worship, health facility, school, recreational centers etc*) due to;

	Yes	No
a. His/her ethnicity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Religious affiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Political affiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Disability status	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Nationality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

27. In your district, have you ever witnessed a situation where someone was treated unfairly due to:

	Yes	No
a. His/her ethnicity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Religious affiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Political affiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Disability status	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Nationality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

28. Indicate your level of agreement of the following statements by ticking one of the likert scale given: True, Somewhat True, Somewhat Untrue and Untrue

Statement	True	Somewhat True	Somewhat Untrue	Untrue
It's sometimes necessary to use violence to fight against things that are very unjust	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sometimes it is necessary to use violence to reach political and economic objectives	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sometimes people have to resort to violence to defend their values, convictions, or religious beliefs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
It's OK to support groups that use violence to fight injustices	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
It's sometimes necessary to use violence, commit attacks, or kidnap people to fight for a better world	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

#### SECTION D: CONTRIBUTION OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST VE.

##### (NON-STATE ACTORS)



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29a. Do you know of any Civil Society Organization(s)/NGOs implementing protection activities and combating radicalization in your locality?

- i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

29b. If Yes, mention at least one of such CSOs/NGOs

.....  
.....

29c. Briefly describe what they do specifically

.....  
.....

30a. Have you ever attended a forum or an engagement on preventing violent extremism organized by any NGOs/CSOs?

- i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

30b. If Yes, mention the name of the NGO/CSO

.....  
.....

31a. Have you heard about any education or information on addressing or preventing violent extremism in your district?

- i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

31b. If yes which main communication medium, did you hear from? (*Select One*)

- i. Radio.....☐  
ii. Television.....☐  
iii. Community Information Centers.....☐  
iv. Social Media (Facebook, Twitter).....☐  
v. NCCE Website .....☐  
vi. News Portals .....☐  
vi. Any other .....



**(STATE ACTORS)**

32a. Have you ever attended a forum or an engagement on preventing violent extremism organized by any government entity (institution/ministry or agency)?

- i. Yes.. ☐      ii. No.. ☐

32b. If Yes, Mention one of such entity (**Select One**)

- i. District/Municipal/Metropolitan Assembly.....☐
- ii. Ministry of Information.....☐
- iii. Ministry of Defence.....☐
- iv. NCCE.....☐
- v. Ministry of Local government and rural development.....☐
- vi. Information Service Department.....☐
- vii. Don't know.....☐
- viii. Other .....

33a. Are you aware of any measures put in place by your Metropolitan/Municipal and District Assembly to prevent violent extremism and other forms of violent acts?

- i. Yes ☐      ii. No ☐

33b. If Yes, mention one of such measures

- i. The establishment to DISEC and Municipal security task Force to handle security issues on the district.....☐
- ii. Persistent security patrol in and along the borders of the district.....☐
- iii. Creating job avenues through youth employment programs to prevent the youth from falling prey to extremism groups.....☐
- iv. Increase in the number of police stations and post in the district.....☐
- v. Others.....

34. How effective do you think your district has been in addressing violent acts?

- i. Very effective.....☐
- ii. Somewhat effective .....☐
- iii. Not at all effective.....☐

35a. Are you aware of any measures put in place by government to prevent violent extremism and other forms of violent acts in the country?

- i. Yes ☐
- ii. No ☐

35b. If Yes, mention **two** of such measures

.....

.....

36. Have you heard about the government's "See something, say something" campaign which encourages citizens to be vigilant against violent extremism activities?

- i. Yes ☐
- ii. No ☐

37. In your opinion whom should one report to when he/she sees any suspicious activities in the community/ district? **(Select one)**

- i. Family elder.....☐
- ii. Friend/family member.....☐
- iii. Land lord.....☐
- iv. Security Service (Police, Immigration, Army) ...☐
- v. Assemblyman/woman.....☐
- vi Chief .....☐
- vii Religious leader .....☐
- viii Other .....☐

38. How effective do you think the government has been in its efforts to address the problem of violence in this country?

- i. Very effective.....☐
- ii. Somewhat effective .....☐
- iii. Not at all effective.....☐

39. In your opinion, what more can be done to prevent violence in your district?

- i. Government should empower law enforcement institutions to enforce laws on violence in the district.....☐
- ii. Citizens should adhere to the rule of law and ensure peace at all times.....☐
- i. Government should resource the security agencies to strengthen surveillance at the borders.....☐
- ii. Government should provide sustainable jobs/employable skills for the youth....☐
- iii. Parties to conflict should be encouraged to resolve their differences through effective dialogues.....☐
- iv. NCCE and Information Service Department should be better resource to sensitize the public on the need for peaceful existence.....☐
- v. Other .....

40. In your opinion, what do you think is the best way for the government to address the country's potential threat to violent extremist activities? (*Select One*)

- i. Strengthen the military response or military capabilities.....☐
- ii. Working together with religious leaders to address the issue.....☐
- iii. Working together with traditional leaders to address the issue.....☐
- iv. Cooperate more with our neighboring countries to address the issue.....☐
- v. Improve the economy and create more jobs.....☐
- vi. Intensify public education on the negative effective of violent extremism.....☐
- vi. Improve education standards.....☐
- vii. Increase resources distributed to states and local communities.....☐
- ix. Don't know .....☐
- x. Other (specify) .....

## APPENDIX II: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

### A. INTRODUCTION

As part of supporting Government efforts to prevent and contain the threat of violent extremism (VE) and other forms of violence in Ghana, the NCCE is presently implementing a project on preventing and containing violent extremism in the northern parts of Ghana. The project will contribute largely to promoting social cohesion, peace and tolerance among Communities and strengthen State and Non-State Actors roles in fighting the menace of violent extremism.

As a first step to the implementation of the project, the Commission is carrying out a study to have a sound appreciation of community attitudes, behaviours and institutional responses towards containing and preventing violent extremism in Ghana.

The study will guide content development for public education and contribute to the discourse on violent extremism nationally and across the northern borders of Ghana in particular.

We invite you to participate in this study by sharing your knowledge and opinion on the subject.

Please, be assured that your participation in this study will be treated as anonymous and your responses will be treated with the utmost confidentiality.

Name of Interviewer: .....

Date of Interview: .....

**B. CONSENT GIVEN FOR INTERVIEW** Yes ☐ No ☐

### C. BACKGROUND/ SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Region	
District	
Locality	
Organization	
Designation/Rank/Position	
Gender	
Educational level	

### D. KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS OF COMMUNITIES AND AT-RISK GROUPS TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE

1. What do you understand by violent extremism?
2. Do you know of any violent extremist groups? (Probe: Name, Objectives, mode of operation, etc)
3. Are there any violent extremism activity (ies) happening in your region/ district?
4. Apart from violent extremism, have you ever witnessed any acts of violence in your district/region over the past 12 months?
5. In your region/district, do you know of any individual or groups who are most likely to engage in violent extremism acts?
6. What would you say would be the potential effects of violent extremism on your region/district if it happens?
7. In your opinion, what sections of the population stand the highest risk to be radicalized to promote violent extremism? (Probe: Gender, Children, Youth, Older Persons, PWDs etc.)
8. In your view, what sections of the population of your region/district, are most at risk of being victims to violent extremist acts?
9. What can motivate people to engage in acts of violent extremism in your district/region?

**E. COMMUNITIES' LEVEL OF TOLERANCE TOWARDS DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC GROUPS**

- 10 How would you rate the level of existence of the following in your community? (For each of the options indicate whether they exist, exist but not with violence or exist with violence)
- a) Political polarization
  - b) Religious intolerance
  - c) Ethnic conflict
  - d) Chieftaincy factions
  - e) Land/Boundary disputes
- 11 Do you know of any situation where some members of your community have been discriminated against based on their; (i) religion (ii) ethnic group or (iii) political affiliation (iv) Gender (v) Nationality?
- 12 Are people with different national, ethnic, religious or political background able to live peacefully in your community?

**F. CONTRIBUTIONS OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

- 13 In your opinion, what is the state of security in terms of safety of persons and protection from extremist attacks in your region/district (Probe: Why?)
- 14 How does your institution respond to risk or threat of violent extremism in your region/district? (Probe: Strategies, Focal persons/unit in place, Challenges)
- 15 How is your institution contributing to peaceful co-existence and national cohesion in your region/district?
- 16 Do you have a focal person whose duty it is to spearhead activities related to violent extremism in your institution? (Probe: If yes, State the specific duties)
- 17 In performing your role as an institution, do you feel equip to response to risk of violent extremism.

18 Are you aware of any other organisation working on preventing and countering violent extremism in your district or region (Probe: CSO's NGO's, Religious Groups, State Institutions)? Briefly describe what they do specifically.

19 Are you aware of any EU funded Actions that has reduced the risk of radicalisation of members of your community and engagements in activities of criminal groups? (Probe: What was the project about?)

#### **G. ROLE OF WOMEN IN PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

20 In what ways can the activities of violent extremist groups hinder gender equality?

21 How does conflict affect men and women in the society?

22 Between men and women who is more prone to adverse effect of violent extremist activities and why.

23 In your opinion, what role can women play in perpetrating violent extremist acts

24 In your opinion, what role can women play in preventing violent extremist acts in the country?

#### **H. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

25 What in your view are the best ways to prevent acts of violent extremism and other forms of violence in your region/district?

## APPENDIX III: SAMPLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION BY REGION AND DISTRICT

NO.	REGION	DISTRICT	DISTRICT SAMPLE SIZE	REGIONAL SAMPLE SIZE
1.	<b>BONO</b>	BANDA	6	
2.	“	DORMAA CENTRAL MUNICIPAL	23	
3.	“	DORMAA WEST	9	
4.		JAMAN SOUTH MUNICIPAL	22	
5.		JAMAN NORTH	24	
	<b>BONO TOTAL</b>			<b>84</b>
6.	<b>NORTH EAST</b>	BUNKPURUGU NYANKPANDURI	17	
7.	“	CHEREPOHI	18	
8.	“	EAST MAMPRUSI MUNICIPAL	38	
9.	“	YUNYOO NASUAN	11	
	<b>NORTH EAST TOTAL</b>			<b>84</b>
10.	<b>NORTHERN</b>	NANUMBA NORTH MUNICIPAL	38	
11.	“	NANUMBA SOUTH	22	
12.	“	SABOBA	19	
13.	“	SAVELUGU MUNICIPAL	25	
14.	“	TAMALE METROPOLITAN	76	
15.	“	TATALE-SANGULI	15	
16.	“	YENDI MUNICIPAL	31	
17.	“	SAGNARIGU MUNICIPAL	69	
18.	“	GUSHEGU MUNICIPAL	31	
19.	“	KPANDAI	26	
20.	“	TOLON	24	
21.	“	KARAGA	23	
22.	“	KUMBUNGU	22	
23.	“	MION	19	
	<b>NORTHERN TOTAL</b>			<b>440</b>
24.	<b>OTI</b>	KRACHI NCHUMURU	27	





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NO.	REGION	DISTRICT	DISTRICT SAMPLE SIZE	REGIONAL SAMPLE SIZE
25.	“	KADJEBI	15	
26.	“	GUAN	6	
27.	“	NKWANTA NORTH	25	
28.	“	KRACHI EAST	12	
	<b>OTI TOTAL</b>			<b>85</b>
29.	<b>SAVANNAH</b>	BOLE	23	
30.	“	CENTRAL GONJA	29	
31.	“	EAST GONJA	24	
32.	“	SAWLA TUNA KALBA	23	
	<b>SAVANNAH TOTAL</b>			<b>99</b>
33.	<b>UPPER EAST</b>	BAWKU MUNICIPAL	24	
34.	“	BAWKU WEST	29	
35.	“	BINDURI	16	
36.	“	BOLGATANGA MUNICIPAL	28	
37.	“	BONGO	24	
38.	“	GARU	15	
39.	“	KASSENA NANKANA MUNICIPAL	20	
40.	“	KASSENA NANKANA WEST	18	
41.	“	NABDAM	11	
42.	“	TALENSI	18	
43.	“	PUSIGA	16	
44.	“	TEMPANE	18	
	<b>UPPER EAST TOTAL</b>			<b>237</b>
45.	<b>UPPER WEST</b>	JIRAPA	18	
46.	“	LAMBUSSIE-KARNI	10	
47.	“	LAWRA	12	
48.	“	NADOWLI-KALEO	16	

NO.	REGION	DISTRICT	DISTRICT SAMPLE SIZE	REGIONAL SAMPLE SIZE
49.	“	NANDOM	11	
50.	“	SISSALA EAST	16	
51.	“	SISSALA WEST	13	
52.	“	WA WEST	19	
53.	“	WA MUNICIPAL	41	
54.	“	WA EAST	18	
	<b>UPPER WEST TOTAL</b>			<b>174</b>
55.	<b>BONO EAST</b>	TECHIMAN MUNICIPAL	49	
56.	“	ATEBUBU AMANTIN	29	
57.	“	PRU EAST	28	
58.	“	NKORANZA SOUTH MUNICIPAL	23	
59.	“	SENE EAST	21	
	<b>BONO EAST TOTAL</b>			<b>150</b>
<b>TOTAL SAMPLE SIZE</b>			<b>1353</b>	<b>1353</b>



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PREVENTING AND CONTAINING VIOLENT EXTREMISM



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## APPENDIX IV:

### DISTRIBUTION AND BACKGROUND OF KEY INFORMANTS INTERVIEWED

REGION	NO. OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED	INSTITUTIONS CONTACTED
NORTHERN	8	Ghana Immigration Service
		Customs Division of GRA
		Regional House of Chiefs
		Christian Council of Ghana
		COGINTA
		ZAA Multimedia
		National Intelligence Bureau
		Office of the Regional Chief Imam
SAVANNAH	9	Ghana Immigration Service
		Ghana Police Service
		Customs Division of GRA
		Regional House of Chiefs
		Christian Council of Ghana
		North Code Ghana (CSO)
		National Intelligence Bureau
		Office of the Regional Chief Imam
		Media (Nkilgi Fm) – Bole

REGION	NO. OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED	INSTITUTIONS CONTACTED
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NORTH EAST	10	Ghana Immigration Service
		Ghana Police Service
		Ghana Armed Forces
		Customs Division of GRA
		Media (Nobyah FM)
		National Intelligence Bureau
		Office of the Regional Chief Imam
		Regional House of Chiefs
		CSO (Holido)
		Christian Council of Ghana (Chaplain for Nalerigu SHS)
UPPER EAST	8	National Intelligence Bureau
		Media (GBC) URA Radio)
		CODAC Ghana (CSO)
		Regional House of Chiefs
		Office of the Regional Chief Imam
		Ghana Immigration Service
		Customs Division of GRA
		NABOCADO (Christian Council)

REGION	NO. OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED	INSTITUTIONS CONTACTED
		Ghana Immigration Service
		Ghana Police service

<b>UPPER WEST</b>	9	Customs Division of GRA
		Media (Radio Wa)
		National Intelligence Bureau
		Office of the Regional Chief Imam
		Regional House of Chiefs
		CSO (Community Development Alliance)
		Christian Council of Ghana
<b>BONO</b>	9	Radio Bar (GBC) - Sunyani
		Ghana Police Service
		Ghana Revenue Authority (Customs Division)
		Ghana Armed Forces
		Citizen's Watch
		National Islamic Movement
		Christian Council of Ghana
		Traditional Chief
		National Intelligence Bureau

REGION	NO. OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED	INSTITUTIONS CONTACTED
<b>BONO EAST</b>	7	Ghana Immigration Service
		Ghana Armed Forces
		Regional House of Chiefs

		Media Gaskia FM
		CSO (Wido)
		National Intelligence Bureau
		Office of the Regional Chief Imam
OTI	7	Customs Division of GRA
		Chief Imam Chiefs
		Christian Council of Ghana
		Media (Oti FM)
		National Intelligence Bureau
		CSO (Citizen Care)
		Ghana Armed Forces



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